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Abstract 
 The associations between exposure and attention to 
late night television talk shows and political comedy 
programs and the outcome variables general political 
knowledge, candidate personal knowledge, civic 
participation, political participation, political 
discussion, and political cynicism were investigated. The 
results indicated that late night television talk shows had 
a positive and significant association with candidate 
personal knowledge, while political comedy programs had a 
positive and significant association with general political 
knowledge and candidate personal knowledge. Neither late 
night television talk shows nor political comedy programs 
significantly contributed to civic participation or 
political participation. Political comedy programs had a 
significant and positive impact on political discussions. 
Political comedy programs also contributed significantly to 
political cynicism.  
The information processing strategy active reflection 
was also examined to determine the mediation relationship 
between exposure and attention to late night television 
talk shows and political comedy programs and the outcome 
variables general political knowledge, candidate personal 
xiv 
knowledge, civic participation, and political 
participation. The results did not support that the 
hypothesis that active reflection mediated the relationship 
between late night television talk shows and political 
comedy programs and the outcome variables general political 
knowledge, candidate personal knowledge, civic 
participation, and political participation.  
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Chapter One 
 
Introduction 
A cornerstone of criticizing American political 
officials is a barbed wit. This is evident in the writings 
of Mark Twain, Ambrose Bierce, and Will Rogers who employed 
political satire to illuminate the mistakes and 
improprieties of politicians. Mark Twain offered an acerbic 
political critique when he charged that "it could probably 
be shown by facts and figures that there is no 
distinctively native American criminal class except 
Congress" (Twain, 1989). Bierce and Rogers were no happier 
with their country's state of affairs. Ambrose Bierce's 
(1906) The Cynic’s Word Book defined politics as “strife of 
interests masquerading as a contest of principles -- the 
conduct of public affairs for private advantage" (p. 154). 
Later Will Rogers would gibe, "With Congress, every time 
they make a joke it's a law; and every time they make a 
law, it's a joke" (Ayres, 1993, p. 45). These humorists, 
through satirical, humorous quips questioned the actions 
and legitimacy of political actors and institutions. Early 
political critiques rarely held politicians in high regard. 
Today, television remains true to early humorists by 
continuing the tradition of lampooning politicians on late 
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night entertainment and humorous political talk shows. 
Steve Allen and Jack Parr introduced the American audience 
to the late night entertainment talk show genre. On NBC’s 
Tonight Show, Jack Parr invited Hollywood celebrities and 
nationally known politicians such as Richard Nixon, John 
Kennedy, Robert Kennedy, and the Cuban revolutionary Fidel 
Castro into America’s living rooms (Carter, 1994; Moore, 
2000; Munson, 1993). Parr was quick with a joke or gag, but 
he conducted a kind and polite interview. Robert F. Kennedy, 
recognizing Parr’s professionalism and popularity, made his 
first public appearance following President John F. 
Kennedy’s assassination on the Tonight Show. Allen and Parr 
engaged in teasing, yet their humor was not malicious, and 
politician’s rewarded them by agreeing to appear on their 
program. 
As politics became more rancorous following the 
Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal (Cappella & Jamieson, 
1997; Patterson, 1994; Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995), 
humorists also availed themselves of opportunities to 
unkindly critique politicians. In fact, Tonight Show host 
Johnny Carson became so skilled at directing jeering 
remarks toward public officials that his comedic commentary 
“became the country’s most acutely observed political 
barometer” (Carter, 1994, p. 16). Describing Johnny 
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Carson’s political humor, Carter wrote, “the ones he made 
fools of were truly in trouble” (p. 16). From 1962 until 
1992, Johnny Carson’s monologues were rich with political 
jokes. Carson, however, explained that he should not become 
a social commentator; he believed that the serious business 
of politics and the frivolity of his monologues, skits, and 
interviews were mutually exclusive (Buxton, 1987; Jones, 
2005).  
Following Johnny Carson’s 1992 retirement, a new class 
of late night entertainment talk show and humorous 
political talk show hosts emerged. Their brand of ridicule 
and scorn has initiated a reconsideration of the audience’s 
interaction with the genre and has also assisted in 
facilitating a “fundamental change in political 
communication in America” (Jones, 2005, p.7).  
Marshal McLuhan (1964) first considered the 
implications of the late night entertainment talk show 
following President Nixon’s 1963 piano performance on Jack 
Parr’s Tonight Show. Following McLuhan’s analysis, only an 
occasional study of the genre emerged (Buxton, 1987; 
Timberg, 1987). After Governor Clinton’s 1992 saxophone 
performance on the Arsenio Hall Show, other scholars became 
interested in alternative political media and their 
contribution to the electorate (Diamond & Silverman, 1995). 
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Recent research has examined political comedy programs, 
such as Politically Incorrect with Bill Maher and The Daily 
Show with Jon Stewart (Jones, 2005). 
The goal of this study is to advance our understanding 
of late night entertainment talk shows and political comedy 
programs as a form of political communication. Marshall 
(1997) offered a useful frame for establishing the 
dimensions of late night entertainment talk shows. Marshall 
explained that late night entertainment talk show hosts 
historically had been comics who employed humor to critique 
the  “transgression of public discourse,” and he argued 
these programs intersected with other media, such that 
“guests are primarily performers, writers, and actors who 
are promoting recently released films, books, theatrical or 
concert productions, or recordings” (p. 125). He further 
explained that the programming is constructed so hosts 
might be invited “into the hidden world of the stars,” 
which would transcend the parameters of “personal promotion 
or cultural product promotion” (p. 125). While acerbic 
comments about public officials abound, the primary purpose 
of this programming is to elevate the celebrity. 
Political comedy programs, however, exceed the 
political content limitations of late night entertainment 
talk shows. Jones (2005) explained that shows like The 
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Daily Show with Jon Stewart and Real Time with Bill Maher 
employ politics as the “central compositional and 
discursive feature” (p. 10). He noted several unique 
features of this programming. The programs “eschew an 
insider’s perspective” on political discussions, thus the 
host engages nonexperts, such as comedians, actors, 
musicians, and authors. These individuals, Jones suggested, 
offer an insightful and entertaining perspective on 
political matters and through the course of programming the 
host and guests engage in “direct and specific talk” about 
politics (p. 10). Jones also explained that host and guests 
regularly “speak truth to power,” irrespective of political 
party. The primary purpose of political comedy programming 
is to employ humor and satire to assess politics and 
government.  
Theory 
Cultivation theory will operate as a framework for 
understanding the influence of late night entertainment 
talk shows and political comedy programs. The cultivation 
theory of mass communication proposes that television and 
the persistence of certain messages contribute to a social 
reality that is reflective of media content (Gerbner, 
1973). The central assumption underlying cultivation 
analysis is that people who view more television will 
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internalize a social reality that is reflective of the 
media world.  
A central criticism of cultivation theory is the 
assumption the world on television is uniform across 
programs, and scholars critical of the theory suggest the 
existing fragmented media environment disallows the 
construction of a mirrored social reality (Potter 1993; 
Potter & Chang, 1990). This research, however, is not 
concerned with all television programming; rather the 
research examines the “persistence” of the audience’s 
interaction with late night television talk shows, 
political comedy programs and their specific contribution 
in cultivating an audience’s social reality.  
Another criticism of the cultivation theory of mass 
media is that hypothesized relationships are “very weak or 
possibly nonexistent” (Potter, 1988; 1993). This research 
takes Potter’s (1988) advice and includes measures of 
formal learning to elaborate on the cultivation theory of 
mass media. For example, Potter (1998) described that young 
people who watched television news “should be expected to 
learn about current events; and adolescents who view more 
news in this manner should be expected to learn more about 
current events” (p. 938). Potter extended his analysis to 
entertainment television arguing that “when adolescents  
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view TV for entertainment purposes, it is much less 
reasonable to hold an expectation that greater exposure 
would lead to greater amounts of learning” (p. 938). 
Several arguments support investigating the relationship 
between late night entertainment talk shows, political 
comedy programs and important outcome variables.  
Rationale for Study 
 There are several arguments justifying the study of 
the late night television talk shows and political comedy 
programs and their impact on the dependent variables: 
political cynicism, civic participation, political 
participation, political discussion, and the information 
processing strategy active reflection, as well as general 
political knowledge and candidate personal knowledge.  
Medium. The first rationale is to concentrate on the 
impact of television. Television is the medium of choice 
when people seek news and information (Baum, 2003), and 
television news is an important source of current events 
information (Chaffee, Zhao, & Leshner, 1994). Benoit and 
Hansen (2004) reported in a longitudinal study of National 
Election Studies data from 1952 to 2000 on average 80% of 
Americans relied on television to learn about presidential 
campaigns, while 69% relied on newspapers, 44% relied on 
radio, and 35% depended on magazines.  
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As the Internet has proliferated, television has 
remained the dominant source of political information. In a 
Pew Center survey conducted during 2004, they explained 
that 76% of Americans received campaign news from 
television, 46% read newspapers, 22% listened to radio, and 
21% surfed the Internet.  
 Nontraditional sources of news. The second rationale 
is that nontraditional television sources of political 
information are increasingly becoming sites where young 
voters say they learn about candidates and campaigns. These 
programs differ in purpose and the hosts emphasize elements 
of culture, entertainment, and politics differently. For 
example, the late night television talk show is at the 
“nexus of all sorts of ‘talk’ – journalism, fiction, 
criticism, politics, research, [and] Hollywood films” 
(Munson, 1993, p. 6).  Political comedy programs, such as 
the Daily Show with Jon Stewart and Real Time with Bill 
Maher, focus on current social and political events (Jones, 
2005).    
 Despite the programs’ emphasis, young people say they 
learn about candidates and campaigns. In 2004 and 2000, the 
Pew Center reported that 13% of respondents under age 30 
say they regularly learn from late night talk shows. The 
2004 Pew survey found respondents aged 18-29 more likely to 
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regularly learn from late-night talk shows than C-Span, 
NPR, Sunday political talk shows, and news magazines.  
In 2000, the Pew Center described that 9% of young 
people age 18-29 reported regularly learning something from 
comedy television programs, such as the Daily Show with Jon 
Stewart. In 2004, that percentage had grown to 21% of young 
people regularly learning campaign news from comedy 
television programs. The 2004 Pew survey data shows that 
young people who say they learned regularly from comedy 
programs were only 2% below those who say they regularly 
learned from network news and newspapers about candidates 
and campaigns. In summary, survey data indicate that young 
people self-report political learning from late night talk 
shows and political comedy programs.  
 Candidate usage of nontraditional media. The third 
rationale for conducting this study is that candidates are 
appearing on late night entertainment television talk shows 
and political comedy programs with greater frequency. 
Politicians have contested highly packaged television news 
coverage with appearances on talk shows before, but 
beginning in 2000 candidates began to utilize these 
programs more frequently (Baum 2003, Jones, 2005). During 
the 1992 presidential election, candidates who appeared on 
talk shows were largely responding to the 9.2 second sound 
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bite that traditional news programming afforded (Adatto, 
1990; Hallin, 1992). Following the 1992 presidential 
election cycle, candidates increasingly utilized 
nontraditional media as candidate sound bites on network 
television news continued shrinking before flattening at 7-
8 seconds (Lowry & Shidler, 1995; Patterson, 2002). Talk 
show appearances allow candidates’ time to speak with their 
audience and develop both the public and private persona 
(Just, Crigler, Alger, Cook, Kern, & West, 1996; Patterson, 
1994; Van Zoonen, 2005) and to demonstrate their status as 
“regular guys” (Baum, 2003, p. 273). Munson (1993), 
perhaps, best described candidate appearances when he wrote 
that talk shows provide a “fuller, cheaper, more direct 
link to the public” (p. 3). 
Audience response. A fourth argument justifying an 
examination of late night entertainment talk shows and 
political comedy programs are the tremendous audience 
response received when candidates appear on the programs. 
For example, Senator John Kerry’s appearance on the Late 
Show with David Letterman was seen by 5.4 million viewers. 
McClintock (2004) explained that this was Letterman’s 
strongest season premiere in 11 years, and was one rating 
point higher than the Tonight Show with Jay Leno. In 2000, 
Vice President Al Gore’s appearance on the Late Show was 
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seen by 4.5 million viewers. Greppi (2000) wrote that this 
was Letterman’s strongest Thursday night rating since 
December 31, 1998. When Governor George W. Bush appeared on 
the Late Show, the program posted the season’s highest 
ratings with 6.56 million viewers (Bernstein, 2000). Given 
the large audience response, these programs deserve further 
scholarly attention 
In summary, people choose television, above other 
media, when seeking news and information. In using 
television as a source of public affairs information, young 
people increasingly say they learn from television’s 
nontraditional sources of political information. 
Candidates, too, are employing nontraditional sources of 
political information to influence audiences; appearing 
with greater frequency on late night entertainment talk 
shows. When candidates appear on these programs, the 
candidate interviews are seen by millions of audience 
members. 
Cultivation Theory. The advancement of media theory is 
another reason for investigating late night talk shows and 
political comedy programs’ contributions to cognitive and 
behavioral outcomes. Gerbner and Gross (1976) described 
that “entertainment is the most broadly effective 
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educational fare in any culture” (p. 172). They further 
explained that television:  
offers the unsuspecting viewer a continuous stream of 
‘facts’ and impressions about the way of the world, 
about the constancies and vagaries of human nature, 
and about the consequences of actions (p. 178). 
Plainly, the average viewer’s awareness of reality is a 
derivative of exposure to television. Thus, a central focus 
of this research is to test cultivation theory to 
understand whether greater viewing of late night television 
talk shows and political comedy programs contribute to 
cognitive and behavioral outcomes.  
Further, this research seeks to expand the cultivation 
theory literature by accounting for criticisms of the 
original proposition. The original theory stated that it 
matters not what a viewer watches, but how much time the 
viewer watches.  Scholars have noted several criticisms of 
this proposition (Potter, 1993; Potter & Chang, 1990). This 
research seeks to address those concerns by investigating 
specific genres of television programming to understand 
whether the genre contributes to a cultivated mediated 
reality. It is believed that this consideration will add to 
the explanatory power of cultivation theory. 
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Political cynicism. Cappella and Jamieson (1997) 
offered that cynicism is a feeling that “human conduct is 
motivated wholly by self interest” (p.26). Studies point to 
television as the culprit responsible for increasing levels 
of cynicism toward government (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; 
Patterson, 1994; Putnam, 2000). Horse-race coverage of 
campaigns and highly-packaged, slick political 
advertisements are suggested to shape citizen’s cynical 
responses. These cynical responses and diminished levels of 
trust are said to deplete social capital, or the “trust 
that facilitates coordination and cooperation for mutual 
benefit” (Putnam, 2000, p. 67). 
Late night entertainment television and political 
comedy programs offer new avenues for explaining a 
citizen’s feelings of cynicism. Bennett (2003) explained 
that people may seek late night television talk shows to 
assist in “deconstructing” information presented to 
traditional news formats.  Hart (2000) further described 
that audience members enjoy seeing politicians “woo them” 
on talk shows, but “decry them for being too slick, too 
coy, too charming, and too practiced” (p. 25). It would 
seem that these viewers understand that late night 
entertainment talk shows and political comedy programs 
provide counter-spin to traditional news and public 
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relations reporting, while at the same time presenting 
political candidates in much the same way they present 
actors, musicians, and authors; as commodities to be 
consumed.  
The negative political humor in late night 
entertainment talk shows may contribute to feelings of 
cynicism and the program’s structural constraints may also 
lead to political cynicism. Scholars note that typically 
hosts have limited knowledge of public affairs, pitch 
softball questions to candidates, and programs offer 
gimmicks to capture a larger audiences share (Depke, 1992; 
Hollander, 1996; Taylor 1992, cited in Pan & Kosicki, 
1997). For example, David Letterman interviewed Hillary 
Rodham Clinton who was seeking the U.S. Senate seat from 
New York. Nagourney (2000) described that Letterman’s 
interview with Hillary Rodham Clinton consisted of 
questions about her family, how she liked living in 
Chappaqua, New York, and how Buddy and Socks (the Clinton’s 
dog and cat) were getting along. These questions were 
followed by Letterman’s administering a pop quiz about the 
state of New York. Hillary Clinton matched Letterman’s wit 
by offering her own humorous replies and Top 10 list. 
Citrin and Muste (1999) explained that political trust 
refers “to the faith people have in their government” (p. 
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465). Trust is not a measure of approval or disapproval of 
government, rather a measure of whether citizens feel like 
“they truly belong to a political community” and whether 
“they believe that the government operates fairly and is 
deserving of respect and obedience” (Citrin & Muste, 1999, 
p. 465).  
The content of television news and the structure of 
reporting have been offered as reasons for declining levels 
of political trust. Patterson (2000) explained that as 
negative reporting gained a foothold in the news cycle, 
citizen’s trust of politicians and government declined. 
Owen (1997) noted that “media reports exacerbate, or at 
least reinforce, negative public attitudes by highlighting 
conflict and failure in government and by ignoring 
cooperation and success” (pp. 85-86). The news media’s 
negativity has become a signifier for the decline in 
citizen’s trust of government. 
As late night entertainment talk shows and political 
comedy programming grow in popularity, an entertainment 
orientation toward politics may further diminish levels of 
political trust. Content analysis of late night comedy 
programs reveal a high degree of negativity in jokes and 
monologues directed at politicians. Nitz, et al. (2003) 
reported that 68% of jokes were negative in tone and “made 
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fun of something a candidate did or said, and an 
unflattering frame was usually attached to it” (p. 171). 
Additionally, Moy and Pfau (2000) concluded that the late 
night talk show category was “one of the more negative in 
characterizations of the presidency, Congress, the court 
system, and public schools” (p. 82). Entertainment talk 
shows and political comedy programs offer a response to 
current affairs that differs in tone and content from 
traditional news outlets. Hart (1999) declared that taking 
the “unseriously serious” promises to provide a fuller 
picture of how media contribute to the ailments of society. 
Political participation. A growing body of research 
has focused on understanding how television contributes to 
a citizen’s concept of political activity and civic 
engagement (Postman, 1985; Putnam, 2000; Tichi, 1991). 
These examinations have generally suggested that television 
is harmful to our democratic practice.  For example, Hart 
(1999), argued that “television . . . tells us how to feel 
about politics, producing in us a swagger whereby we tower 
above politics by making it seem beneath us” (p. 5). Hart 
further explained that television’s restructuring of 
feelings “has made the burden of citizenship increasingly 
taxing for us and it is . . . responsible for much of the 
alienation we now feel” (p. 5). Other research has focused 
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on television’s positive contribution to the practice of 
politics (Pinkleton & Austin, 2001; Pinkleton, Austin, & 
Fortman, 1998). The advantage of critical studies is the 
ability to draw the readers’ attention to the language and 
symbols of television, but these studies fail to 
empirically describe the extent to which television 
programming may distance the viewer from his or her 
feelings of empowerment.  
Citizen participation is a behavioral outcome 
variable. A citizen’s participation in public affairs may 
manifest itself differently for different people. For 
example, some may choose to participate through 
volunteering. Others may choose a more traditional 
political role, such as voting. This research seeks to 
explore both domains recognizing traditional forms of 
political participation and other forms of civic 
participation, such as volunteering, club membership, and 
social and religious activities.  
Putnam (2000) described that numerous forms of citizen 
participation have experienced declines through the last 
several decades resulting in diminished levels of social 
capital. Others challenge whether Americans have 
experienced those disconnections (Verba, Schlozman, & 
Brady, 1995). Putnam (1995) explained that television is 
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the primary contributing factor to declining citizen 
participation. Uslaner (1998), however, offered a defense 
of general television usage arguing there is no evidence 
suggesting that television viewing consumes time that may 
be available for citizen participation. Rather than 
exploring the whole of television as a contributor to 
declining citizen participation, this research seeks to 
determine whether late night entertainment talk shows and 
political comedy programs influence citizens’ political and 
civic participation.    
Political knowledge. Another important cognitive 
outcome variable considered is political knowledge. 
Political knowledge is a concern of this study given a 
knowledgeable electorate’s theoretical importance to the 
health of democratic institutions (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 
1996). Further, knowledge of domestic and foreign issues 
and understanding the basic processes of government are 
said to be prerequisites for a citizen to act effectively 
(Beaumont, 2004; Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Thompson, 
1970). While political knowledge is considered important to 
the practice of citizenship, studies have described that 
political knowledge levels have remained relatively low, 
but stable through the decades (Bennett & Rademacher, 
1997). 
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To add to our understanding of political knowledge, a 
growing number of studies have begun to explore the role of 
entertainment media in providing political information. For 
example, scholars have offered critical analytical 
examinations of late night television talk shows’ 
contributions to political knowledge (Jones, 2005; Paletz, 
2002; Van Zoonen, 2005). Other scholars have explored 
individual media’s contribution to political knowledge 
during campaigns (Drew & Weaver, 1998; Hollander, 1995; 
Weaver, 1996).  
Despite the frequency and novelty of politician and 
political candidate appearances on late night entertainment 
talk shows, the hosts’ humorous monologues and skits remain 
central to the programs’ political content. Content 
analysis research reveals that talk show programming is 
relatively free of issue discussion, or humor about 
political issues, and jokes are generally negative toward 
the target. Baum (2003) reported in a content analysis of 
soft and hard news programming that late night talk show 
hosts rarely mentioned the oppositional party or candidate, 
and seldom engaged in policy discussions while interviewing 
a candidate.   
 In an analysis of 115 random segments of late night 
comedy shows, Nitz, Cypher, Reichert, and Mueller (2003) 
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concluded similar findings reporting that 75% of the jokes 
were concerned with a politicians’ character or 
personality, while only 14% of jokes were issue related. 
Niven, Lichter, and Amundson (2003) found that the majority 
of late night jokes focused on the candidate’s personality 
and also concluded that “late-night humor is determinedly 
non-issue oriented” (p. 130). This study is needed to 
understand whether late night entertainment talk shows and 
political comedy programs contribute to cognitive outcomes, 
specifically political knowledge.  
This examination of political knowledge is also 
warranted because people with varying levels of political 
interests seek news from different sources. Luskin (1990) 
explained that previous research demonstrated that those 
“with a keener interest in politics notice more of the 
political information they encounter and think more 
seriously about the political information they notice” (p. 
335). Further illuminating the issue of political interest, 
Chaffee and Kanihan (1997) describe that people with low 
political interest obtain news from different sources than 
do those with high interest. In fact, since the Pew Center 
(2004) stated that a higher percentage of those ages 18-29 
self-reported regularly learning from late night television 
talk shows and TV comedy programs scholars should determine 
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how political interest and late night entertainment talk 
shows and TV political comedy programs contribute to 
political knowledge.  
In summary, numerous arguments exist to support this 
study. The first argument concerns television’s 
predominance as a source of political information for most 
Americans. This study also has value because nontraditional 
televised sources of political information are increasingly 
sites where young people learn about politics. 
Additionally, late night entertainment talk shows and 
political comedy programs have become strategic platforms 
for candidates’ to advance themselves and their 
candidacies. Another key reason for conducting this 
research is that audience viewing is significant when 
candidates appear on talk shows. 
The main theoretical argument for conducting this 
research is to examine a specific subset of entertainment 
programming that frequently includes political content, 
rather than the whole of television. From the perspective 
of evaluating democratic outcomes, there were also a number 
of reasons presented to conduct this study. As late night 
entertainment talk shows and political comedy programs have 
added to the complexities of understanding political 
communication, it is useful to understand their 
 22 
contribution to political cynicism, citizen participation, 
and political knowledge.  
Purpose of Study 
Using cultivation theory as a foundation, this 
research, focusing on young voters, seeks to expand the 
literature on cultivation theory by examining the 
relationship between greater viewing of late night 
television talk shows, political comedy programs and levels 
of political cynicism, political participation, and levels 
of political knowledge. Further, this investigation will 
expand the literature on media use and late night 
television talk shows and political comedy programs by also 
exploring whether interpersonal discussion and active 
processing and reflective integration, as information 
processing strategies, contribute to political knowledge 
and citizen participation.  
 This study attempts to both answer and go beyond calls 
that communication researchers study “young people’s 
relationships with new media and with the public sphere of 
political debate” (Buckingham, 1997, p. 36), by expanding 
the public sphere to include nontraditional sites of 
political discourse. It is hoped that this investigation 
enriches the research examining the mass media’s reporting 
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of political information by focusing on popular media and 
popular culture.  
 This study will proceed as follows. Chapter 2 
describes cultivation theory as a foundation for this 
study. Additionally, the chapter will focus on previous 
research that has examined the relationship between 
newspapers, television news programs, entertainment 
programming and political cynicism, political 
participation, and political knowledge. Finally, the 
chapter will explore previous research findings that seek 
to understand the role of active processing and reflective 
integration in cognitive and behavioral outcomes. Chapter 3 
outlines the methodology and describes the statistical 
procedures employed to conduct this study. Chapter 4 
reports the results. Chapter 5 discusses the findings; 
identifies strengths and weaknesses of the study, and 
offers recommendations and future questions. 
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Chapter Two 
A Review of the Literature 
If you want to reach nonpolitical people – who are, 
let’s face it, most Americans – then you go on 
Letterman and Leno. Gore knew it, Hillary knew it. 
It’s become part of the political circuit (Schneider, 
as quoted in Aucoin, 2000) 
 William Schneider’s comments are a poignant reflection 
of our nation’s democratic health and discourse. His 
analysis suggested a politically disengaged, information 
anemic, but, perhaps, an entertained citizenry. He 
announced to the laity what scholars, representing 
different intellectual camps, have suggested for years: 
obtaining political information from television and 
entertainment sources inhibits the citizen from actively 
and competently participating in a functioning democracy 
(Hart, 1999; Postman, 1985; Putnam 1995, 2000; Schudson, 
1997). 
 In his book Bowling Alone, Putnam cleverly captured 
the essence of these critics’ concern when he wrote: 
TV-based politics is to political action as watching 
ER is to saving someone in distress. Just as one 
cannot restart a heart with one’s remote control, one 
cannot jump-start republican citizenship without 
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direct, face-to-face participation. Citizenship is not 
a spectator sport (Putnam, 2000, p. 341). 
Accordingly, to sustain a healthy and thriving democracy, 
citizens must know about political affairs and actively 
create, converse about and participate in a political 
community. Otherwise, we risk continuing trends of low 
voter turn-out (Casper & Bass, 1996; Waldman, 2001), and of 
those who do vote, most likely they will be uninformed when 
they reach the polls (Converse, 1964; Delli Carpini & 
Keeter, 1991). 
 These claims, however compelling, represent only one 
side of the “thriving democracy” equation. In her book, 
Processing Politics, Graber (2001) took exception to the 
argument that television has been a major destructive force 
in the nation’s democratic health. In fact, she explained 
that television has offered significant contributions to 
society. Television has given legitimacy to social and 
political movements by providing information to mass 
audiences, and major policy changes have occurred because 
television has mobilized supporters (Graber, 2001; pp. 122-
124). Television may also assist in restoring normalcy 
following natural-disasters or man-made calamities, and 
television may enable the preservation of cultural values 
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providing information to reading and non-reading audiences 
(Graber, 2001, pp. 124-128). 
 Graber identified televisions’ positive attributes, 
thus questioning Putnam’s indictment of television’s 
negative effect on community and democracy; Pippa Norris 
(1996) explained that disentangling the American viewer’s 
program selection from civic participation is central to 
understanding the complex issue of “democratic health.” 
Norris conceded that increased television viewership 
appears to support Putnam’s thesis, but she argues that the 
citizen’s television program choices should also be 
considered. Responding to critiques, Putnam (2000) offered 
a clarification of his earlier thesis suggesting that 
“selective viewers” are less susceptible to diminished 
civic capacity than “habitual viewers”. For Norris, the 
ability to choose programming that discussed difficult 
social, economic, and political issues may lead audience 
members to consider issues they may otherwise avoid. Thus, 
it would therefore be reactive to identify television as a 
cancer on democracy.  
Graber (2003) offered similar analysis, suggesting 
that the uniformity of television and newspaper media is 
simply a myth.  Television programming is not monolithic, 
but fragmented. Graber explained of great differences 
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existing in content, framing, and presentation across the 
media spectrum, and it is “foolhardy to generalize about 
‘the media’ because any generalization leads to overly 
broad, deceptive summary judgments” (p. 140). 
Clearly, concerned scholars have undertaken a lively 
debate to explore television’s impact on citizenship. Much 
of this debate has focused on the activity of watching 
television and how this activity may deprive citizens of 
knowledge and opportunities to create and expand community. 
In the past, scholars have examined the impact of news and 
politically oriented talk shows on a range of political 
variables. It is only recently, however, that scholars have 
begun to explore how entertainment media shape political 
knowledge and civic engagement. 
Theoretical Perspective 
Cultivation theory. The major theoretical underpinning 
of this research is cultivation theory. Scholars such as 
Putnam (1995, 2000), Norris (1996), and Graber (2003) have 
written about the implications of television on democratic 
health; central to their positions is the advancement or 
criticism of cultivation theory. Inherent in each argument 
are questions concerning the time spent watching 
television, the content of programming, and the structure 
or narrative frameworks presented on television. Similarly, 
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this research is concerned with the cultivation effects 
associated with late night entertainment talk shows and 
humorous political talk shows and political comedy programs 
on political cognitive and behavioral outcomes. Late night 
television talk shows are those programs with the primary 
purpose of discussing a celebrity and their latest 
“cultural product” (Marshall, 1997). Political comedy 
programs are those television shows that use celebrities to 
confront and critique government and politics through the 
use of satire and humor (Jones, 2005).  
Cultivation theory postulates that the pervasiveness 
of television and the persistence of certain messages 
contribute to a social reality reflective of media content. 
Explaining their theory, Gerbner and Gross (1976) described 
that television functions as a major symbolic conveyor . . 
. a “chief source of repetitive and ritualized symbol 
systems cultivating the common consciousness of the most 
far-flung and heterogeneous mass publics” (p. 174). They 
furthered their analysis arguing: 
television viewing also makes a separate and 
independent contribution to the “biasing” of 
conceptions of social reality within most age, sex, 
educational, and other groupings, including those 
presumably most “immune” to its effects (p. 191).  
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The term cultivation is central to Gerbner’s exploration of 
television’s influence.  
 Cultivation is the consumption and internalization of 
key cultural components, known as cultural indicators. 
Cultural indicators construct a “coherent picture of what 
exists, what is important, what is related to what, and 
what is right” (Gerbner & Gross, 1976, p. 176, see also 
Gerbner, 1969, p. 145). Additionally, Gerbner and Gross 
(1976) described that a cultural indicator “legitimizes 
action along socially functional and conventionally 
acceptable lines” (p. 176).  
For Gerbner, the central question became whether 
television worked so well in cultivating a social reality 
that audiences became socialized to “uniform assumptions, 
exploitable fears, acquiescence to power, and resistance to 
meaningful change” (p. 178). Gerbner, Gross, Morgan, and 
Signorielli (1980) concluded that the cultural indicators 
alone were not enough to cultivate a social reality, but 
that the “amount of exposure to television is an important 
indicator of the strength of its contribution to a way of 
thinking and acting” (p. 14). Thus, cultivation theory is 
composed of two primary constructs: cultural indicators and 
levels of television exposure. The central proposition is 
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that heavy viewers of television will internalize a social 
reality that is reflective of the media world. 
Numerous scholars have advanced criticisms against 
cultivation theory on methodological and theoretical 
grounds. One criticism advanced against cultivation theory 
is the absence of identified cultural indicators. The most 
frequently employed cultural indicator is the violence 
index (Potter, 1990, see also O’Keefe, 1984). Researchers 
have also studied such divergent topics as age, race, sex, 
and such topics as political orientation, American 
stereotypes, and civil liberties (see Potter 1993; 1990). 
Gerbner’s (1969) questions of existence, importance, 
relation, and message tone coupled with the “analytical 
measures” of attention, emphasis, tendency, and structure 
have, as Potter (1993) described, left scholars without a 
“conceptualization of what might be the complete set of 
cultivation indicators” (p. 567). 
Further, Potter (1993) has critiqued the idea of the 
cultural indicator on conceptual ground. For example, 
Potter argued that cultural indicators must be evaluated in 
the larger contextual framework of the message; otherwise 
measures of occurrence may lead to inaccurate inferences 
about the message system. Potter also noted that the answer 
choices available to receivers constrained their 
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interpretation of messages, unnecessarily limiting a 
researcher’s explanation of the respondents’ understanding 
of media messages. 
The concepts of uniform messages and non-selective 
viewing have also received criticism. As originally 
announced, cultivation theory assumed that the world on 
television was uniform across programs, depending on the 
narrative structures of programming to unify a cultivated 
television reality (Gerbner, 1969; Gerbner, Gross, Morgan, 
& Signorielli, 1994). Potter (1993) explained that this 
assumption fails to allow for differences across 
programming and noted researchers, in particular Gerbner, 
have found differences in narrative structures across 
programming (see Tamborini & Choi, 1990, see also Gerbner, 
Gross, Signorielli, Morgan, & Jackson-Beeck, 1978). In 
fact, Gerbner et al. (1978) found in a yearly comparison of 
content that different time periods and different networks 
exhibited varying levels of violence in their programming. 
Potter (1993) concluded that while differences may exist in 
programming, violence remains pervasive and high, although 
with the explosion of cable channels, VCR’s and DVD’s, it 
is possible to be a heavy viewer of television without 
being exposed to programming that is inherently violent.  
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 Potter’s conclusion raises the issue of measurement 
for non-selective exposure. Again, the original assumption 
was that audience members would watch whatever programming 
was available. Exposure was a function of the time 
available to the audience, rather than a particular program 
or genre of programming. Potter concluded that heavy 
viewers of television, because of increasingly fragmented 
media, may not share similar conceptions of reality. In 
essence, because of the explosion of available programming, 
when audiences watch television there is great variation in 
the genres available. Thus, for a shared reality to be 
cultivated by a message system viewers must watch the same 
programs. If these criticisms are accurate, cultivating a 
specific social reality would be difficult to accomplish. 
Potter and Chang (1990) argued that critical 
challenges to uniformed messages required an expansion of 
dominance that goes beyond simply measuring overall 
exposure to media, but should reflect a viewer’s exposure 
to different programs and genres of media. Potter and Chang 
concluded that “the dominance at the level of program type 
is a better predictor of cultivation than is dominance at a 
more general level which expresses the concept of the 
balance between television and real world influences” (p. 
330). This expansion of dominance enables researchers to 
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collect data that is more representative of the viewer’s 
media experience.  
 Potter (1993), Hawkins and Pingree (1990), and O’Keefe 
and Reid-Nash (1987) suggest that the effects announced by 
Gerbner and Gross (1976) have largely been discounted for a 
number of reasons. First, while there is sufficient content 
analysis of television programming to suggest high amounts 
of violence on television, there is little evidence to 
suggest any behavioral or attitudinal change among viewers, 
especially when researchers control for confounding 
variables (Doob & MacDonald, 1979; Hirsch 1980, 1981; 
Hughes, 1980; O’Keefe, 1984) Also, while there are limited 
findings associating program exposure to the cultivation of 
a specified social reality, some conclusions consider these 
findings “spuriously high” (Potter, 1988, 1993). Earlier, 
Potter (1986) wrote “that the relationships that are 
significant are only weak to moderate in strength and that 
many of these disappear or become curvilinear when controls 
are introduced” (p. 159). Potter (1988) wrote that “this 
model might work better under conditions of formal learning 
rather than incidental learning” (p. 938).   
 Other researchers, noting the shortcomings of 
Gerbner’s cultivation theory as it was originally 
announced, also continue to employ its constructs and 
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proposition, if only in a modified version. For example, 
O’Keefe and Reid Nash (1987) and O’Keefe (1984) studied the 
cultivation effects of crime entertainment and crime news 
expanding the independent variables employed, examining 
exposure to specific programs versus exposure to overall 
viewing, and investigating whether certain psychological 
predispositions influenced relationships between viewing 
messages about crime and the viewers thinking and feeling 
about crime.  
 One final criticism of cultivation, as a cumulative 
effects theory, is that “viewers will be influenced by 
television but it offers no insight, as of yet, as to how 
viewers are being influenced” (Potter, 1993, p. 596). 
Hawkins and Pingree (1990) explain, too, that there needs 
to be some demonstrable linkage established between 
television exposure and cognitive effects. Pfau, Mullen, 
and Garrow (1995) and Moy and Pfau (2000) offer the ideas 
of primary and secondary socialization as a plausible 
linkage. Berger and Luckman (1967) first articulated the 
concepts of primary and secondary socialization when they 
posited that primary socialization is:  
the immediate apprehension or interpretation of an 
objective event expressing meaning, that is, as a 
manifestation of another’s subjective processes which 
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thereby becomes subjectively meaningful to myself (p. 
129). 
More succinctly, primary socialization is the learning of 
information, as it is presented by socializing agents such 
as parents, schools, and the media. The person’s 
acquisition of knowledge is made significant through the 
personalization of the information presented. 
 Berger and Luckman explained that secondary 
socialization occurs when an individual is fully socialized 
into society and is introduced to “new sectors of the 
objective world” (p. 130). More thoroughly, secondary 
socialization assumes “the internalization of semantic 
fields structuring routine interpretations and conduct 
within an institutional area” (p. 138). Moy and Pfau (2000) 
contend that primary and secondary socialization “enrich 
cultivation theory” and “explain how mass media 
communication influences people’s perceptions of democratic 
institutions” (p. 46). 
 In sum, this research is concerned with the cumulative 
effects of late night entertainment talk shows and 
political comedy programs.  A myriad of criticisms have 
been raised against cultivation analysis, yet the theory 
remains intellectually appealing and is applied in ways 
that address shortcomings. 
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Political Cynicism 
 Critical commentary has long suggested that media 
negatively contribute to political discourse, and reason, 
resulting in a cynical public. Some have even suggested 
that “television makes us feel good about feeling bad about 
politics” (Hart, 1999; see also Postman, 1985; Putnam, 
1995). Empirical research, however, has presented mixed 
findings concerning newspaper and television news’ 
contribution to cynicism. A paucity of evidence exists for 
late night television talk shows and political comedy 
programs and their contribution to political cynicism. 
Traditional media performance and political cynicism.  
Early findings suggested that TV news consumption 
resulted in distrust, inefficacy, and cynicism (Robinson, 
1976), yet Miller and Reese (1982) found that reliance on 
media contributed to feelings of efficacy and political 
activity. While this finding is optimistic it failed to 
settle the debate about newspaper and television news’ 
contribution to feeling negative toward politics. In 
evaluating media content, it is understandable why this 
debate persists.   
 Media use research provides insights into how 
newspapers, television news, and nontraditional media 
contribute to political cynicism. Researchers have 
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investigated media reliance and cynicism. O’Keefe (1980) 
found that television news reliance did not contribute to 
greater political cynicism than newspaper reliance. Leshner 
and McKean (1997) found that individuals who use newspapers 
and television news to acquire political information were 
less inclined to be politically cynical than those who 
employed radio or magazines. This finding is noteworthy 
given television news was entered as the final block in a 
hierarchical least-square regression. Thus, the stringent 
nature of the statistical control demonstrates that “at 
neither time did television news use play a substantial 
role in predicting cynicism” (p. 79).  
 Research findings focused on media framing are 
decidedly different. Weaver (1996) explained that media 
coverage of elections that emphasizes “campaign strategy 
and maneuvering can make some voters more cynical and less 
likely to vote” (p. 34).  In a study of media framing in 
the Netherlands, De Vreese (2004) examined coverage of the 
European Union economic question. He found that strategic 
news coverage contributed to political cynicism, but the 
effect was not long-term. Additionally, he found that 
levels of efficacy and political knowledge contributed to 
political cynicism. Efficacious individuals were less 
likely to demonstrate cynicism, while political knowledge 
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contributed to cynicism. De Vreese did explain that 
political knowledge was a weaker contributor to cynicism, 
than was the strategic news coverage. These findings are 
significant because they exist outside a campaign context 
and suggest newspaper and television news’ contribution to 
cynicism is not necessarily long term. 
 In a comprehensive study of distrust and cynicism 
toward government institutions, Moy and Pfau (2000) 
demonstrated the complex interrelationships between media, 
institutional depiction, and viewer effect.  In content 
analysis of print news coverage, network television news 
coverage, and television entertainment talk shows Moy and 
Pfau explained that each medium contributes to 
institutional depictions differently. This review includes 
three of the five institutions examined. They described the 
negative nature of television news toward the presidency 
and Congress, yet noted that television news spared the 
court system a degree of negativity. They explained that 
the print media were “more benign” in their coverage, and 
“newspapers and magazines were moderately negative in 
coverage of the presidency and Congress . . ., but were 
fairly positive in their depictions of the court system” 
(p. 81). Additionally, Moy and Pfau explained that 
“television talk shows were consistently hostile toward 
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most institutions” (p. 81). They did detail that the 
research on television talk shows “focused more on daytime 
talk than late night talk shows” (p. 72). 
Moy and Pfau described how each medium contributed to 
an information consumer’s confidence in the presidency, 
Congress, and the court system. They concluded that 
“reading newspapers enhanced confidence levels directly and 
increased respondent’s expertise in these institutions, 
which in turn enhanced evaluations” (p. 96). Expertise 
constituted elements of awareness, knowledge, and interest 
in the democratic institution. Despite the print media’s 
propensity to include negative content about the presidency 
and Congress, Moy and Pfau explained that the positive 
evaluations of democratic institutions may be explained in 
overall “general patterns of media use among individuals” 
(p. 99).  
The research also demonstrated that watching network 
television news did not contribute to negative evaluations 
of the presidency. Watching network news initially 
negatively contributes to global attitudes, but watching 
network news also enhances presidential expertise which in 
turn contributes positively to global attitudes. Watching 
network news contributes to expertise which leads to 
confidence and trust in the presidency. This finding runs 
 40 
counter to conventional wisdom about network news’ negative 
effects. 
Network nightly news’ effect on viewers’ perception of 
Congress and the court system, however, is a different 
story. Network nightly news negatively contributed to 
global attitudes and trust in Congress and the court 
system, and network news failed to influence Congress and 
court system expertise. The expertise variable, however, 
did contribute to improving assessments of Congress and the 
court system. Local television coverage led to positive 
assessments of the presidency, but contributed no effect on 
assessments of Congress or the court system. 
In sum, television news does not contribute to greater 
political cynicism than does newspapers. Other media such 
as magazines and radio, however, do contribute to greater 
levels of political cynicism.  Researchers have also 
explored the content of the news and have found 
strategically framed content and negative and hostile 
reporting to contribute positively to political cynicism.  
 Nontraditional media performance and political 
cynicism. Few research studies have expressed concern for 
the cultivation effects of late night television talk shows 
and political comedy programs on political cynicism. 
Studies have examined the content of the Tonight Show with 
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Jay Leno and the Late Show with David Letterman (see Niven, 
Lichter, & Amundson, 2003), while another concluded that 
late night entertainment talk shows breed contempt, 
alienation, and imparts the “language of cynicism” (Hart, 
1999). Another has examined candidate trait ratings 
following jokes, monologues, and political appearances on 
late night talk shows and political comedy programs (Young, 
2004). 
In one of the few studies that examined entertainment 
talk shows contribution to the democratic process, Moy and 
Pfau (2001) explained that entertainment talk shows were 
“most brutal” in their presentation of the presidency, 
“hostile” when presenting information about Congress, and 
more negative than news magazine and magazines in their 
coverage of the court system (pp. 75-77). Moy and Pfau 
reported that watching entertainment talk shows have 
indirect negative effects on global attitudes and 
trustworthiness for the Presidency and Congress, and 
indirect negative effects for confidence and Congress, but 
only indirect effects for confidence and the Presidency. 
They only found indirect effects for confidence and the 
court system. They concluded that watching entertainment 
talk shows “have detrimental impacts on the confidence of 
institutions (p. 148). It should be noted that Moy and Pfau 
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operationalized entertainment talk shows to include Oprah, 
Late Night with David Letterman, The Tonight Show with Jay 
Leno, 60 Minutes, Dateline NBC, and 20/20. They also 
explained that their focus was on daytime talk shows and 
not late night television talk shows and the research did 
not include measures for political comedy programs. 
In summary, there is a paucity of research regarding 
the cultivation effect of late night television talk shows 
and political comedy programs on political cynicism. Jones 
(2005) reported that the host’s reject the interpretation 
that they contribute to a cynical political environment. 
Yet, there is evidence to suggest that viewing 
entertainment talk show programs undermines the 
individual’s assessment of the presidency, congress, and 
the courts. While the emphasis in previous studies has not 
been on late night television talk shows or political 
comedy programs there is little reason to believe that 
these programs would perform differently than daytime 
television talk shows. Especially, as some have argued that 
“fringe joking presents opportunities for various comedic 
orientations that simultaneously support and oppose 
dominant ideologies” (Buxton, 1987). Therefore:  
 H1: Greater viewing of late night television talk  
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shows is positively associated with political 
cynicism. 
H2: Greater viewing of political comedy programs is 
positively associated with political cynicism. 
Citizen Participation 
 Numerous critics have pointed to television as a 
factor in diminishing both civic and political 
participation. For example, Gerbner and colleagues (1978) 
explained that the television world presents a uniform 
message across programming and viewers come to believe in 
that mediated reality. This analysis holds that the 
viewers’ reflection of reality “should be seen as [a] 
generalized response to the central dynamics of the world 
of television drama” (p. 205). Building on earlier 
arguments concerning viewers’ responses to television, 
Gerbner, et al. (1980) explained that heavy exposure to 
television actually makes individuals disinclined to become 
involved in forging the bonds of community (pp. 17-19). 
Other critics like Putnam (1995) have derided television as 
a primary detractor from participating in civic 
organizations and suggested that television has contributed 
to an overall decline in social capital. Brehm and Rahn 
(1997) furthered this analysis explaining that television 
use is an opportunity cost; “a serious drain upon the civic 
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participation side of social capital” (p. 1015). These 
critics argue that either the content of television or the 
time lost due to viewing television inhibit people’s 
capacity to participate.  Recent research findings on 
newspaper reading, television news, and nontraditional 
media provide an interesting story of media interaction and 
citizen participation. 
 Traditional media performance and citizen 
participation. Previous research on traditional media 
performance and citizen participation provides a baseline 
for understanding nontraditional media and citizen 
participation. Research has concluded that both newspapers 
and television news contribute to participation. Scheufele 
(2002) found that both newspaper hard use and television 
hard news use had significant effects on political 
participation. In an earlier study, Pfau, Cho, and Chong 
(2001) also found that reading newspapers was a significant 
predicator of political participation. They further 
explained that other traditional news media such as news 
magazines, television news, radio news, and television talk 
shows also contributed to political participation, but none 
reached the level of significance of newspapers. Eveland 
and Scheufele (2000) also found newspapers to predict 
political participation, such as donating money and 
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campaigning for a candidate. Television news use, however, 
was not found to be a predictor of political participation. 
Yet, television news use was found to predict voting. They 
contend that political participation requires more of the 
individual than does voting. Shah, McLeod, and Yoon (2001) 
found print and broadcast media to contribute to civic 
participation, or “participating in community projects, 
volunteering, and engaging in other membership activities” 
(p. 468).  
Higher levels of education may explain why television 
news and newspaper reading interact differently with 
political participation. Eveland and Scheufele found 
significant interaction between newspaper use, education, 
and political participation. Education, however, did not 
significantly interact with television news use and 
political participation. They explained that the “linear 
presentation of news on television makes political content 
more easily accessible for audience members with varying 
levels of educational attainment” (p. 231). Eveland and 
Scheufele’s analysis is consistent with Chaffee and 
Kanihan’s (1997) research which found television to inform 
politically unsophisticated audiences. Education’s 
interaction with newspaper use is the likely result of the 
content newspapers make accessible to readers. 
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In sum, newspaper and television news use positively 
predicts both civic and political participation. Newspaper 
reading is a stronger predictor of a wider range of 
political participation, yet television news use also 
contributes to lesser demanding forms of political 
participation, such as voting. As scholars continue to 
research the effects of traditional news media on citizen 
participation, it is also important to expand this 
investigation to include nontraditional media.  
 Nontraditional media performance and citizen 
participation. The findings on nontraditional television at 
best demonstrate that certain programming contributes to 
participation, and at worst fail to significantly diminish 
citizen participation. These findings are counter to 
Gerbner, et al. (1980) and Putnam’s (1995) claims that 
television undermines trust and social capital. For 
example, Moy, Xenos, and Hess (2005) found late night 
television talk shows to predict campaign participation, 
intention to vote, and political discussion. These findings 
were especially positive for those who were considered 
politically sophisticated. They noted that these findings 
may not reflect those less politically sophisticated 
because it takes knowledge of the political sphere to find 
the jokes and monologues humorous. Despite this caveat 
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concerning political knowledge, entertainment programming 
makes a contribution to political participation, most 
significantly political discussion. Previous research 
examining nontraditional media’s contribution to citizen 
engagement, however, found television entertainment talk 
shows to make no significant contribution to 
engagement/participation (Pfau et al., 2001).  
Other research concentrating on the broad status of 
entertainment television demonstrates that television 
program viewing does not significantly inhibit civic 
participation, or participation in one’s community through 
organization membership. Uslaner (1998) explored media use 
and the loss of social capital. Like Putnam (1995), Uslaner 
employed simple exposure measures to assess the impact of 
viewing television on participation levels. He tested 
whether television acts as a time-cost for participation 
and whether heavy viewers of television programming reflect 
a mediated reality. He concluded that “decisions about 
joining organizations don’t reflect time pressures” (p. 
458). He also offered that “No matter how we slice it, 
there are not impacts for television viewing among any 
cohort or for the entire sample. People’s values, social 
connections, and social resources shape their decisions to 
participate in civic groups.” (p. 458). Those who watch 
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television continue to engage in civic participation when 
they have the resources to do so and when those activities 
are important to them. When examining the viewers’ 
perception of the world and television content, Uslaner 
found little support for Gerbner’s mean world hypothesis. 
Uslaner’s examination concluded there was “no systematic 
media effects on either trust or civic engagement” (p. 
463).  
Shah, McLeod, and Yoon (2001) found that when 
individuals employ media for informational uses media are 
related to civic participation. Additionally, they found 
that media genres contribute to civic participation 
differently. For example, when accounting for demographics, 
social situation, and social orientation television social 
dramas are significant predictors of civic participation. 
Television situation comedies, however, are negative 
predictors of civic participation. Television situation 
comedies were also negative predictors of civic 
participation before accounting for controls. Shah, McLeod, 
and Yoon argued that the “effects are determined by 
exposure to specific content rather than by overall use” 
(p. 491).    
In an earlier study, Shah (1998) found that television 
viewing contributed positively and negatively to civic 
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participation demonstrating the dynamic nature of different 
genres of programming. For example, social drama viewing is 
positively related to participation, where science fiction 
viewing is negatively related.  Noting that time spent 
watching television may be an opportunity-cost for 
participation, Shah explained that the programming content 
matters much more than the total time spent watching 
television.    
In summary, there is a paucity of research on late 
night television talk shows and citizen participation. Of 
those studies, research has presented mixed findings on 
late night television talk shows contribution to 
participation. Primarily, though, researchers have found 
that entertainment television fails to contribute to 
Gerbner’s mean world hypothesis noting that entertainment 
genres contribute to citizen participation differently. 
There is limited explanation of why late night television 
talk shows and political comedy programs, or other 
entertainment programming, would independently contribute 
to participation. One, however, could infer that political 
interest and political knowledge are important factors in 
that contribution. Therefore: 
H3: Greater viewing of late night television talk 
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shows is positively associated with civic 
participation. 
H4: Greater viewing of political comedy programs is 
positively associated with civic participation. 
H5: Greater viewing of late night television talk 
shows is positively associated with political 
participation. 
H6: Greater viewing of political comedy programs is 
positively associated with political 
participation. 
H7: Greater viewing of late night television talk 
shows is positively associated with the 
likelihood of voting 
H8: Greater viewing of political comedy programs is 
positively associated with the likelihood of 
voting. 
Political Knowledge 
 The cultivation theory of mass communication proposes 
that television and the persistence of certain messages 
contribute to a social reality that is reflective of media 
content (Gerbner, 1973). The central assumption underlying 
cultivation analysis is that those who view more television 
will internalize a social reality that is reflective of the 
media world. Political knowledge is an objective measure 
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and does not fit the traditional model of cultivation 
analysis; however, Potter (1988) argued that assessing 
formal learning may allow for further elaboration of the 
cultivation hypothesis. Thus, this study pushes beyond an 
individual’s perception of mediated reality, to examine 
what a person learns about the political world from late 
night television talk shows and political comedy programs, 
as increasingly popular forums of political discourse. 
 Political Knowledge Defined. Political knowledge is 
thought to be a key mediating factor in producing 
democratic outcomes, and political knowledge presents 
numerous opportunities for this study. First, the 
operational definition has implications for what reasonably 
may constitute an indicator of political knowledge. Second, 
the definition dictates the expansiveness of what may be 
considered political knowledge. Finally, the definition 
provides for what may be considered a contributor to the 
acquisition of political knowledge.  
Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) emphasized the overall  
importance of political knowledge describing that political 
information leads citizens to be “attentive to politics, 
engaged in various forms of participation, committed to 
democratic principles, opinionated, and . . . efficacious,” 
and they concluded that “no other single characteristic of 
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an individual affords so reliable a predictor of good 
citizenship” (p. 6).  
Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) operationally defined 
political knowledge “as the range of factual information 
about politics that is stored in long-term memory” (p. 10). 
Exploring Delli Carpini and Keeter’s definition of 
political knowledge is important because it has 
implications for measuring what people know about the 
political world. 
In discussing the merits of this definition, Delli 
Carpini and Keeter held that the construct was useful in a 
number of ways. Principally, the inclusion of the term 
information made it clear that political knowledge was not 
to be confused with other variables such as political 
attitudes, values, beliefs, or opinions. Focusing on 
information recall disentangled the respondents’ answers 
from their subjective experiences with information that 
might entrench values, alter beliefs, or create opinions. 
Further, the notion that information is factual, 
presupposed a level of correctness and verifiability 
concerning a political claim. While Delli Carpini and 
Keeter (1996) noted that determining correctness was 
problematic, creating a factual standard, none the less, 
established a “basis for comparison,” even though many may 
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operate with competing definitions of the condition or 
problem (p. 11). Thus, this “basis for comparison” becomes 
a starting point in an attempt to remove subjective 
responses from analysis. 
To establish the basis for comparison, Delli Carpini 
and Keeter (1991) proposed two categories of political 
facts. The first category included “taught facts,” or those 
learned in school. Jennings (1996) defined “taught facts” 
as information concerning the “mechanics of government and 
politics” and labeled these “textbook facts” (p. 229). For 
example “taught facts” or “textbook facts” may include 
information concerning governmental processes, 
responsibilities of the different branches of government, 
and consideration of civil liberties. Delli Carpini and 
Keeter (1991) found that since the 1950’s the public’s 
knowledge of “taught facts” has remained relatively stable. 
Despite increases in educational level and opportunity, 
Delli Carpini and Keeter (1991) explained that over time 
education and sex have had essentially the same effects. 
Thus, knowledge of “taught facts” is relatively enduring. 
They called the second category of political facts 
“surveillance facts” (p.598). Jennings (1996) suggested 
that “surveillance facts” concern current event issues. 
Delli Carpini and Keeter (1991) concluded that respondents 
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of all ages were less likely to correctly answer current 
events questions. Jennings (1996) provided a plausible 
explanation for this trend explaining that “surveillance 
facts” were “more changeable and require monitoring, 
especially through the use of the mass media and personal 
interaction” (p. 229). 
Testing for this political knowledge dichotomy is not 
without critic. Graber (2001) raised concern with the Delli 
Carpini and Keeter political knowledge test used to assess 
“taught” facts. She claimed several methodological 
shortcomings including flawed standards of knowledge, 
assumptions in political decision-making, test question 
design, and the type of information sought for decision-
making. Graber argued that citizens are relatively well 
informed concerning information that matters to them, 
suggesting that most people act as “cognitive misers” (p. 
46). For example, knowledge of who the Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court is of little value in overall political 
understanding. Ostensibly, supporting Graber’s analysis, 
Gilens (2001) tested for generalized “textbook” facts and 
“surveillance” facts. He concluded that knowing generalized 
“textbook” facts may not matter to overall decision-making 
that requires policy specific facts. 
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Others have also questioned the usefulness of the 
“ideal informed citizen” and “textbook” facts as measures 
of political knowledge. Schudson (1998) argued that today’s 
citizen subscribes to a “monitorial citizen” model. 
Schudson (1995) described the tension between informed 
citizens and the informational, or “monitorial citizen” as 
those individuals who are:  
not defined by a consumer’s familiarity with the 
contemporary catalog of available information but by a 
citizen’s formed set of interests that make using the 
catalog something other than a random effort (p. 169). 
The informed citizen gathers information, reflects on its 
content, and makes informed evaluations. These critical 
decision-makers seek to understand procedural connections 
within a linear policy frame, while at the same time 
informed citizens are sense-makers seeking to understand 
how policies are interconnected and the implications the 
policies will have for the republic.  
 Graber (2001) however, suggested that the ideal 
citizen is likely difficult to achieve in a media rich, 
advanced democracy. Citizens are most likely informational, 
consuming media narratives that construct a repertoire of 
limited public affairs knowledge (Schudson, 1998). Page and 
Shapiro (1992) argued that individuals make political 
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decisions employing the best information available to them 
at the time and that taken as a whole the mass audience is 
largely responsive to elite behavior. Thus, Page and 
Shapiro argue that the public is rational and predictable 
regarding political issues; irrespective of the quality and 
quantity of political information consumed. Popkins (1994) 
also offers similar criticism of the “ideal informed 
citizen” arguing that individuals do not need full 
information to make decisions that are consistent with 
their beliefs. Popkins writes that: 
 shortcuts for obtaining information at low cost are 
 numerous. People learn about specific government 
 programs as a by-product of ordinary activities, such 
 as planning for retirement . . . they obtain economic 
 information from their activities as a consumer . . . 
 they also obtain all sorts of information from the 
 media. Thus they do not need to know which party 
 controls Congress, or the names of their senators, in 
 order to know something about the state of the economy 
 or proposed cuts to social security or the 
 controversies over abortion (p. 213). 
To account for Schudson’s (1998) “monitorial citizen” 
surveillance facts are offered to assess what political 
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information citizens may be monitoring on late night 
television talk shows and political comedy programs. 
While some question exists about the merits of 
possessing knowledge of “textbook” facts, most 
communication research remains concerned with mass media’s 
contribution to political knowledge. As such, researchers 
have employed measures of “surveillance,” to determine 
levels of learning from media. Chaffee, Zhao, and Leshner 
(1994) explored three levels of knowledge including 
difference of party position on issues, differences of 
candidates on issues, and the personal, biographical data 
about a candidate. Price and Zaller (1993) investigated 
levels of current events knowledge while using a general 
political knowledge scale. Each of the measures required 
exposure to media for information. Knowing specific facts 
about issues, political parties, and candidates would 
require the “surveillance” of various media as political 
topics unfold, change, and fade.   
Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) explained that 
citizen’s may possess a range of factual information. The 
inclusion of a range of political information is warranted, 
as Iyengar (1990) concluded that individuals may acquire 
information for certain domains, but not others. For 
example, a citizen may know much about a president, but 
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know little about the role of the executive branch in 
general. Understanding a population’s knowledge of a range 
of factual information enables scholars to make statements 
about levels of domain specific and general political 
knowledge.  
Finally, Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) defined 
politics as the “authoritative allocation of goods, 
services, and values” (p. 12). They explained that this 
definition of politics was originally articulated by David 
Easton (1965), and the definition is expansive in scope as 
it allows for the inclusion of popular culture as a factor 
in politics. For instance, Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) 
argued that the “poststructuralist and neo-Marxists [saw] 
the culture industry as reproducing (and occasionally 
challenging) patterns of domination and subordination in 
society through television [and] popular music” (p. 12). In 
a similar vein, Shea (1999) presented a model of popular 
culture and politics, where each interacts to construct and 
reflect political reality. Thus, citizens may be acquiring 
political information through various traditional and 
nontraditional sources of communication and with different 
impact. 
In sum, Delli Carpini and Keeter’s recognition of 
different key elements provides researchers an opportunity 
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to study a range of concerns regarding what citizens know 
about politics. The definition allows for an assessment of 
previously learned political material, while accounting for 
the shortcomings of rote factual recall. The inclusion of 
surveillance facts accounts for what an individual learns 
from traditional news media, as well as, nontraditional 
media. Additionally, the definition allows for individuals 
who may possess general or more specific knowledge about 
the political landscape, while also appreciating that 
nontraditional political programming may be contributing to 
a citizen’s knowledge of the political, social, and 
cultural world. Ostensibly, this definition of political 
knowledge provides a fuller view of what citizen’s know 
about the political world. 
 Traditional media performance and political knowledge. 
Investigating the effects of late night television talk 
shows and political comedy programs necessitate reviewing 
the literature on traditional media’s contribution to 
political knowledge. Research on traditional media’s 
contribution to political knowledge has resulted in mixed 
findings. Early studies on television and newspapers 
attempted to explain which channel was best for political 
learning. Most likely, this emphasis was due to the 
ubiquitous nature of television, as Gerbner et al.(1994) 
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noted “television is the source of the most broadly shared 
images and messages in history . . . television is a 
centralized system of storytelling” (pp. 17-18). While not 
necessarily concerned with the cultivation effects of 
television, this early research on voter learning and media 
use employed global exposure measures to determine 
television news’ contribution to political knowledge. 
Early studies concluded that television news media 
were less informative than newspapers. The research 
explained that people who depended on television where less 
knowledgeable than those who read newspapers (Blumler & 
McQuail, 1969; Patterson & McClure, 1976; Robinson & Levy, 
1986), and relying on television most likely contributed to 
a widening knowledge gap (Becker & Whitney, 1980), while 
dependence on television news might actually undercut 
knowledge development (Clarke & Fredin, 1978). In 
revisiting earlier findings, Robinson and Levy (1996) 
maintained that “television news continues to be a 
relatively weak overall predictor of long-term information 
gain” (p. 135).  
Brians and Wattenberg (1996), however, presented 
findings supporting television news as a contributor to 
political knowledge. They found television news to be 
weakly associated with political knowledge of a candidate’s 
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issue position. Clearly this finding supported previous 
research, yet they found little evidence to suggest that 
attention to newspapers improved knowledge of a candidate’s 
issue position. Brians and Wattenberg (1996) explained that 
controlling for education and campaign interest may 
diminish newspapers significance in informing the public. 
This means that individual differences such as higher 
education levels and campaign interest account for variance 
with political knowledge, as does media use and attention. 
This finding points to the complexities in identifying a 
medium’s contribution to knowledge gain. The research 
comparing newspaper use and television news media use, 
however, has generally concluded that newspapers are 
especially informative. 
Television makes a particular contribution to 
political learning for those less likely to seek political 
information. In a study of how news media contribute to the 
political understanding for the politically 
unsophisticated, such as young people, Chaffee and Kanihan 
(1997) explained that uninformed voters employ television 
as a “bridge” to become knowledgeable about public affairs. 
These findings demonstrate the difficult relationships that 
exist between television news, newspapers, and political 
knowledge and suggest that television may function as a 
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gateway to different types of political information and 
media. 
It could be argued that claiming a medium’s 
superiority in advancing political learning is misplaced; 
that medium superiority is a function of the measurements 
employed to determine political knowledge. Previous 
research found that exposure to television news was 
negatively associated with political knowledge (Robinson & 
Levy, 1986). Other studies that included levels of 
attention paid to media, however, found television news to 
be positively associated with political knowledge (Chaffee 
& Schleuder 1986; McLeod & McDonald 1985; Weaver & Drew, 
1995, 2001; Zhao & Chaffee, 1995). Early studies simply 
examined levels of exposure to media, rather than 
considering the information processing that individuals 
engage in to understand information. For example, a 
person’s television may be on and tuned to a news channel, 
but the person may pay very little attention to the 
programming because of other demands. Attention, however, 
necessitates engagement with the programming. Exposure to 
newspapers necessarily involves attention because of the 
cognitive processes operating while reading news stories. 
This clarification of measures also recognized fundamental 
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differences in how each medium presents information and the 
diverse requirements needed for information processing.  
Each medium presents unique communicative and 
cognitive demands. Miller and Reese (1982) suggested that 
television and newspapers require different information 
processing skills because “television is better suited to 
presentation of the dramatic and concrete, and newspapers 
better suited to detail and abstraction” (p. 228). 
Identifying differences in a medium’s strengths suggest 
variations in an audiences’ learning. In a review of media 
use and political knowledge research, Chaffee and Frank 
(1996) argued that television is informative; the medium, 
however, completes its task differently than newspapers.  
They crystallized the distinctions between television news 
and newspapers succinctly; “television provides voters a 
close look at candidates, while newspapers tell more about 
policy differences between the major parties” (p. 58). 
Newspapers contribute to information about political issues 
and parties, while television news contributes to candidate 
personal knowledge and an understanding of how candidates 
differ on issues (Leshner & McKeen, 1997; Weaver & Drew, 
1995). 
Recognizing nontraditional media as a growing arena 
for political news and commentary, this research seeks to 
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move beyond traditional news and examine the effects of 
late night television talk shows and political comedy 
programs on political knowledge. Previous studies of 
traditional media found that newspapers inform especially 
well, and television informs those least likely to seek 
political information. The purpose of this research is not 
to declare which medium is best at information gain, but to 
determine the cumulative effect of heavy interaction with a 
particular programming genre on knowledge gain.  
 New media performance and political knowledge. In 
drawing distinctions between traditional and “new media,” 
Davis and Owen (1998) explained that “new media,” is “old 
media technologies” and “mass communication forms with 
primarily nonpolitical origins that have acquired political 
roles” (p. 7). New media allow for inventive coverage of 
political campaigning. For example, the rise of cable 
interview programs provides an opportunity for a candidate 
to speak with an interviewer about their childhood, 
personality, leadership experience, and issue stance. While 
the primary purpose of late night entertainment talk shows 
is to highlight those in the entertainment industry, they 
frequently offer comedic critiques of candidates, the 
presidential campaign, and proposed issues through jokes 
and monologues. Political comedy programs also offer 
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comedic critiques of government and politics, and hosts 
frequently interact with actors, authors, and musicians as 
allies in the humorous political commentary. It is the 
possibility of learning political information through 
viewing these new media that is of interest.  
Early studies on voter learning and new media, 
however, demonstrate that new media are not significant 
predictors of political knowledge. Generally, these 
findings on new media and voter learning have been 
consistent. In a study of the 1992 presidential campaign, 
McLeod and colleagues (1996) found nontraditional media use 
negatively related to knowledge of a candidate’s issue 
position. These researchers defined nontraditional media 
use as presidential debates, political advertising, polls, 
and talk shows. They did not include late night television 
talk shows or political comedy programs in their analysis. 
They explained that while nontraditional media made no 
direct contribution to political knowledge, it was 
“strongest when considered as part of a general pattern of 
attentive use where citizens become interested in the 
campaign and use traditional media forms” (p. 413). They 
speculated that this media use pattern emerged because 
nontraditional media followed the discourse of average 
citizens (see also, Jones 2005, pp. 141-157).  
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In another study of the 1992 presidential campaign, 
Weaver and Drew (1995) found that neither exposure nor 
attention to nontraditional media (television talk shows, 
such as Larry King and morning television network shows) 
influenced political knowledge. They speculated that 
controlling for campaign interest prior to looking for 
media effects may explain why attention to nontraditional 
media was not associated with political knowledge. This 
study, too, included no measure for late night television 
talk shows or political comedy programs.  
Other researchers investigating new media during the 
1992 presidential campaign did find new media to contribute 
to voter learning. In this study of new media and the 1992 
presidential campaign, Chaffee, Zhao, and Leshner (1994), 
found that candidate appearances on talk shows contributed 
to learning about candidates and their differences on 
issues. Like McLeod, et al. (1996), Chaffee and colleagues 
did not speculate as to why talk shows contributed to 
political learning other than to note that talk shows 
encourage candidate interaction with the host and global 
discussion of the issues and the candidate’s position on 
the issues.  
Yet, during the 1996 presidential election, research 
concluded that nontraditional media were not significant 
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predictors of political knowledge. Drew and Weaver (1998) 
explained that television talk show attention was not a 
significant predictor of campaign issue knowledge. They 
defined nontraditional forms of political media as 
television talk show attention and radio talk show 
attention. Interestingly, when respondents were asked how 
much attention they paid to programming, television talk 
show attention increased over 1992 levels. They made no 
specific claim about why this increase in television talk 
show attention occurred, however, it may be attributed to 
the growth in talk show availability on cable television. 
In the 2000 election, Weaver and Drew (2001) again 
found that television talk shows were not predictors of 
campaign issue knowledge. Consistent with their 1996 and 
1992 findings, Weaver and Drew found no association between 
exposure and attention to television talk shows and 
political knowledge, campaign interest, or likelihood of 
voting. To this point, most studies investigated television 
talk shows to determine their contribution to political 
knowledge. Few studies examined the role of late night 
entertainment television talk shows or cable comedy 
programs in contributing to political knowledge. 
Early studies that did include late night television 
talk shows in their analysis of new media and voter 
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learning found mixed findings. Chaffee and colleagues 
(1994) found these programs to negatively predict candidate 
issue knowledge. In a different study of the 1992 
presidential campaign, Hollander (1995) found that 
attention to late night entertainment talk shows and 
daytime talk shows were positively associated with 
perceived knowledge, but not actual knowledge.  
This early research all but dismisses new media as 
contributors to political knowledge; however, it is 
important to note these early studies, with the exception 
of only a few, did not include late night television talk 
shows or political comedy programs in their analysis. 
Additionally, these studies that did include late night 
television talk shows did so before candidates began to 
utilize the Late Show with David Letterman and the Tonight 
Show with Jay Leno as regular campaign stops. The Center 
for Media and Public Affairs (2006) offers yet another 
reason to reconsider earlier findings, as they explain that 
the number of political jokes increased steadily from 1992 
until 1998, and in 2005, President George W. Bush was a 
target of political humor on late night television talk 
shows 553 times compared to 22 jokes targeted at the former 
presidential candidate, John Kerry.  These conditions 
warrant a reexamination of whether late night television 
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talk shows and political comedy programs contribute to 
political knowledge.  
Earlier studies have shown that new media may not make 
an independent contribution to voter learning, but may 
contribute to voter learning if viewers tune into new 
media, develop interest in a campaign, and then seek 
additional information from traditional news media. McLeod 
and colleagues (1996) suggested the elevated strength of 
new media’s contribution to voter learning in general media 
use patterns is noteworthy. Exploring new media as an 
independent contributor and as a media variable that works 
with traditional media to inform voters necessitates new 
media’s inclusion in further studies. Also, as their 
popularity among viewers and political candidates 
increases, late night television talk shows and political 
comedy programs should be more readily included in the 
scope of new media and voter learning research.  
Recent survey research shows that political comedy 
program viewers are knowledgeable about presidential 
campaign. The National Annenberg Election Survey (2004) 
found those who watched Comedy Central’s The Daily Show 
with Jon Stewart were more politically knowledgeable than 
those who do not watch. In particular, the NAES found those 
who watch Comedy Central’s The Daily Show with Jon Stewart, 
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possessed more personal information about candidates and 
knew the issue positions of the candidates. The NAES 
reported that those who watched Comedy Central’s The Daily 
Show with Jon Stewart: 
have higher candidate personal knowledge than national 
news viewers and newspaper readers – even when 
education, party identification, following politics, 
watching cable news, receiving campaign information 
online, age, and gender are taken into consideration 
(p. 1). 
The NAES does not claim a causal relationship between The 
Daily Show and political knowledge, and noted that 
political interest is likely a factor coupled with general 
news media consumption in contributing to political 
knowledge. 
 In sum, the previous research on new media generally 
concluded that daytime and cable television talk shows 
contribute little to general political knowledge (textbook 
facts) or candidate personal knowledge (surveillance 
facts). Most early studies did not include measures 
examining late night talk shows, and it is only recent that 
studies have included political comedy programs. New 
conditions such as political candidate’s utilizing late 
night television talk shows as campaign stops, sometimes 
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multiple times during a campaign cycle, and the increasing 
number of political jokes warrant further examination of 
late night television talk shows. Additionally, political 
comedy programs have demonstrated strong performance in 
predicting political knowledge. Therefore: 
H9: Greater viewing of late night television talk 
shows is positively associated with general 
political knowledge. 
H10: Greater viewing of political comedy programs is 
positively associated with general political 
knowledge. 
H11: Greater viewing of late night television talk 
shows is positively associated with candidate 
personal knowledge. 
H12: Greater viewing of political comedy programs is 
positively associated with candidate personal 
knowledge. 
Media Use and Political Talk 
Conversation has long been hailed a factor in 
contributing to the health of democracy (Barber, 1984; 
Dewey, 1927; Habermas, 1996; Page, 1996), although specific 
types of talk may be more beneficial to the health of 
democracy (Schudson, 1997). Researchers and theorists have 
explained that conversations focusing on political content 
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contribute to people’s understanding of mediated messages 
and politicians’ public utterances, and also contributes to 
an individual’s working through the complexity of one’s own 
thinking as it relates to public affairs issues (Eliasoph, 
1998; Habermas, 1996; Zaller, 1992). Thus, engaging in 
political discussion can enhance one’s understanding of the 
political world.  
News media exposure is associated with political 
conversation frequency. In an examination of political 
conversations’ impact on political knowledge and political 
participation, Scheufele (2000) explained that newspaper 
hard news and television hard news were both positively 
related to political talk. Newspaper hard news, however, 
was more strongly related to political talk, than was 
television hard news. Newspaper hard use and television 
hard news were also found to contribute directly to 
current-events knowledge. Scheufele also found newspaper 
hard news and television hard news to predict political 
talk which led to factual political knowledge. Media use 
contributes directly to political knowledge and through 
political discussion.  
 In a study comparing political talk in the United 
States and England, Bennett, Flickinger, and Rhine (2000) 
found in various datasets a consistent thirty year pattern 
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demonstrating that the more American and British citizens 
talked about politics the more knowledgeable they were 
about politics. Like Scheufele’s earlier findings, Bennett 
and colleagues (2000) found that exposure to newspapers and 
television news predicted political discussion and that 
political discussion predicted political knowledge. 
Political conversation also leads to political 
participation (Bennett et al., 2000; Scheufele, 2000, 
2002). In fact, it can be argued that talking with others 
about politics in one’s immediate or extended community is 
a form of citizen participation (Delli Carpini, Cook, & 
Jacobs, 2004). Political talk thus has implications for the 
production of social capital. 
In their study of conversation and political 
participation, Kim, Wyatt, and Katz (1999) found news media 
exposure to be associated with political conversation 
frequency. They noted, however, due to the “single wave of 
cross sectional survey data” that causality is difficult to 
determine (p. 379). Yet, they infer that mediated messages 
precede political conversation. They continued that media 
use and political conversation were closely associated with 
political participation.  
Scheufele (2000) found that political talk is directly 
and positively related to political participation. 
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Political talk is also indirectly related to political 
participation through political knowledge. Other research 
has been concerned with media use and interpersonal 
discussion’s contribution to political participation.  
Scheufele (2002) supported earlier findings explaining that 
reading “hard news” content in newspaper and interpersonal 
discussion are predictors of political participation.  
Scheufele noted that “hard news” television news interacted 
with interpersonal discussion positively, thus, 
contributing to participation. Scheufele also found that 
newspaper readership contributed to political knowledge for 
those who discussed politics more than those not involved 
in discussions. This finding did not hold for television 
“hard news” viewers, political knowledge, and political 
discussion; as this group did not differ significantly from 
those who did not discuss politics. 
In a study of traditional and nontraditional 
participation, McLeod, Scheufele, and Moy (1999) found 
interpersonal communication to have a “modest” impact on 
traditional forms of participation like voting and 
contacting a public official, yet functions as a strong 
predictor of nontraditional participation like 
“participating in a local political process, such as 
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attending a civic forum on issues of special interest and 
making oneself heard at this forum” (p. 316).  
Examining conversation’s effects offers a unique way 
of understanding political knowledge and political 
participation. Do the mass media contribute to 
conversations about politics? Do conversations contribute 
to political understanding and political participation? 
Researchers in mass communication and interpersonal 
communication have explored these questions and describe 
how news media and conversation interact with important 
political outcome variables. Central to understanding the 
relationship between political talk, political knowledge 
and political participation is the information processing 
strategy involved in making sense of public affairs. 
Political Talk and Information Processing Strategies 
Describing the interrelationship between mass media 
and interpersonal communication, Gumpert and Cathcart 
(1982) called this connection intermedia. They explained 
that people employ mass channels and face to face 
communication in complex ways to facilitate understanding. 
Since the idea of intermedia was introduced, communication 
scholars have advanced an agenda of research that examines 
whether interpersonal discussion mediates the relationship 
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between mass media use and political knowledge and 
political participation.  
One such item on the agenda in exploring the role of 
interpersonal communication and advancing political 
understanding has been an information processing strategy 
called reflective integration. Kosicki and McLeod (1990) 
offered three information-processing strategies for coping 
with various mediated messages. They explained that 
individuals generally hold a set of “tactics” to manage the 
information richness of mediated communication (p. 73). 
These information-processing strategies include selective 
scanning, active processing, and reflective integration.  
Kosicki and McLeod (1990) offered active processing as an 
individual’s attempt to understand the message, and 
attending to different media to make sense of the mediated 
message. Reflective integration is also an explanation of 
how active-consumers and processors of information make 
sense of news media. They described the relationship 
between media use and political understanding explaining 
that: 
people who find certain information highly salient or 
attention-holding should be, through increased mental 
effort and integration, more successful at integrating 
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the new information into what they already know about 
the world (p. 75). 
Kosicki and McLeod explained that through active processing 
and reflective integration, individuals acquire information 
and develop sophistication. Reflective integration 
“represents the postexposure salience of information such 
that it occupies the mind and is the subject of 
interpersonal discussion” (p. 75). In more direct terms, 
important political information remains persistent in a 
persons’ mind and that information becomes the focus of 
public affairs conversations. 
 McLeod, et al. (1999) found that “reflection” is an 
important finding in explaining forum participation. They 
offered that reflection may “help to consolidate the 
fragmentary information learned from the news media” (p. 
765). They found that those who reflected on public affairs 
information in a local context were more likely to attend a 
public forum and speak about issues. 
Sotirovic and McLeod (2001) also examined media’s 
contribution to political participation. In assessing the 
effects of mass media and interpersonal communication they 
found that “people learn from newspaper public affairs 
content and that they elaborate and argue about what they 
learned in interpersonal discussion” (p. 287). The process 
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of reflective integration positively and directly led to 
political participation, more so than did newspaper use 
alone. 
Sotirovic and McLeod also concluded that entertainment 
television discouraged participation, a finding that is 
noteworthy, as they described the “blurring” of 
entertainment and hard news (p. 287). This conclusion 
relates to the softer elements of news programming (see 
also Patterson, 2000), and does not include prime time 
entertainment programming or late night television talk 
shows.  
 Primarily concerned with political participation, 
Sotirovic and McLeod also conclude that political knowledge 
and media use “may not be [of] sufficient condition for 
taking part in politics” (p. 288). They suggested that 
“reflective integration” acts as the moderating variable 
that assists individuals in making sense of fragmented 
political information. Not surprisingly, newspaper reading 
encourages reflective integration, yet Sotirovic and McLeod 
also found television entertainment viewing to support 
reflective integration. Sotirovic and McLeod concluded that 
this information processing strategy has the ability to 
counteract the negative effects of television entertainment 
on political participation. Despite the popular conclusion 
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that the media offers little, Sotirovic and McLeod 
concluded that “when the media provoke individuals to put 
some effort into finding and processing information, they 
offer plenty of politically useful content” (p. 288). 
 In summary, media use variables contribute to 
political conversations and to political knowledge and 
participation differently. It has been found that political 
conversations positively contribute to political knowledge. 
Additionally, political conversations directly contribute 
to political participation. Reflecting on the content of 
media, and then discussing the content with others, also 
has important implications for political knowledge and 
participation. Primarily, active reflection and reflective 
integration, the acts of thinking about the content and 
then discussing the content, has the ability to counteract 
the negative effects of entertainment television on citizen 
participation. Therefore it is hypothesized that: 
H13: Greater viewing of late night television talk 
shows is positively associated with political 
discussion. 
H14: Greater viewing of political comedy programs is 
positively associated with political discussion. 
The next several hypotheses are concerned with the ability 
of active processing and reflective integration to mediate 
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the relationship between late night television talk shows 
and various forms of political knowledge and citizen 
participation. 
H15: Active reflection mediates the relationship 
between:  
a) late night talk shows and general political 
knowledge. 
b) late night talk shows and candidate personal 
knowledge. 
c) late night talk shows and civic participation. 
d) late night talk shows and political 
participation. 
These final hypotheses are concerned with the ability of 
active processing and reflective integration to mediate the 
relationship between political comedy programs and 
categories of political knowledge and political 
participation.  
H16: Active reflection mediates the relationship 
between: 
a) political comedy programs and general 
political knowledge. 
b) political comedy programs and candidate 
personal knowledge. 
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c) political comedy programs and civic 
participation. 
d) political comedy programs and political 
participation. 
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Chapter Three 
Methodology 
 This chapter describes the methods employed to address 
the hypothesis in chapter two. First, this chapter will 
describe the sample for this research and then explain the 
criterion measures and predictor variables. Finally, this 
section will detail the statistical analysis performed to 
determine how well late night television talk shows and 
political comedy programs predict political knowledge, 
citizen participation, and political cynicism. 
Additionally, this section will describe the statistical 
procedures undertaken to determine the mediation effect of 
active reflection.  
Procedure and Sample 
 The sample for this research is a single-cross 
sectional sampling of 18-24 year old students enrolled in 
freshman and sophomore level general education courses. 
These courses are open to all students at the university. 
The surveys were administered at the beginning of each 
course section, and administration took approximately 25 
minutes. The data collection occurred during the week of 
October 18 – 22, 2004 at a small, regional, public 
university in Oklahoma with an enrollment of 3,985 
students. The sampling occurred approximately two weeks 
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prior to the 2004 presidential election, and yielded a 
sample size of 412 respondents which represents 10.3% of 
the enrolled students at this university.    
Criterion Measures 
Political cynicism. To assess political cynicism 
respondents were asked to respond to six items concerning 
their beliefs about politicians and the process of 
governing. Agger, Goldstein, and Pearl (1961) offered this 
scale which includes topics concerning politicians’ 
decision making to get elected, politicians spending time 
getting elected or re-elected, money’s ability to influence 
public policy, politicians manipulating people, and 
politicians representing general or special interests. A 
mean index was created with response categories ranging 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly agree) (M = 
6.37, SD = 1.26, Cronbach’s alpha = .671). Due to low 
internal consistency in the measure of political cynicism 
one item (politician’s in Congress try to do what is best 
for most of the people) was removed from the six item 
index. This removal increased the internal consistency 
(Cronbach’s alpha = .724).  
Civic participation. To assess a respondent’s 
involvement in membership oriented, community activities, 
respondents were asked if they participated in sports 
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(80.1% yes), religious activities (74.4% yes), drama 
organizations (51.9% yes), and group volunteering (71.4% 
yes). These items are similar to items used to assess the 
contribution of media use to civic engagement (Brehm & 
Rahn, 1997; Shah, 1998). When a respondent indicated 
participation in a civic activity a “1” was assigned; 
however, if the respondent did not participate in the 
listed civic activity a “0” was assigned. An additive index 
was constructed with respondents ranging from a 0 – 4.00 (M 
= 2.81, SD = 1.13, KR-20 = .537).  The reliability of the 
original four item scale was assessed (KR-20 = .518), and 
it was determined that the drama item should be removed to 
improve the overall reliability of the scale.   
 Political participation. To assess the level of 
political activity, respondents were asked if they 
participated in political activities such as political 
rallies (14.8% yes), writing a letter to the editor (6.3% 
yes), participating in a human rights organization (7.3% 
yes), an environmental organization (10.4% yes), collected 
money for a social cause (48.1% yes), and student 
government (44.4% yes). The first two items are similar to 
those items used to assess the contribution of news, talk, 
and opinion formation on political participation (Kim, 
Wyatt, & Katz, 1999). The next four items represent 
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opportunities for political participation at the 
respondent’s university. When a respondent indicated 
participation in a political activity a “1” was assigned, 
however, if the respondent did not participate in the 
listed political activity a “0” was assigned. An additive 
index was constructed with respondents ranging from a 0 – 
6.00 (M = 1.31, SD = 1.22, KR-20 = .523). The reliability 
of a five item scale was assessed, however, the removal of 
an item (involvement in student government) failed to 
improve reliability (KR-20 = .517).     
   Voter likelihood. A single question assessed the 
likelihood of the respondent voting in the 2004 
presidential election. The voter likelihood item was 
measured with response categories ranging from 0 (not 
voting), and 1 (not likely) to 10 (highly likely) (M = 
7.60, SD = 3.80). 
General political knowledge. To assess general 
political knowledge, respondents were asked a series of 
five open-ended questions concerning government and 
politics. The questions were representative of Delli 
Carpini and Keeter’s (1993) five item political knowledge 
instrument. The one deviation from the Delli Carpini and 
Keeter’s five-item index was replacing the question about 
the vice-president with a question about the U.S. Senate 
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race in Oklahoma. The questions concerned the 2004 Oklahoma 
U.S. senate candidate (46.8% correctly identified either 
Brad Carson or Tom Coburn), whose responsibility it is for 
interpreting the U.S. Constitution (59.5% correctly 
identified the U.S. Supreme Court), the majority needed to 
override a presidential veto (41% correctly identified a 
two-thirds majority), the controlling political party in 
the U.S. House of Representatives (41% correctly identified 
the Republican Party), and identifying the most 
conservative political party (51.7% correctly identified 
the Republican Party). Correct answers were assigned “1” 
and incorrect answers were assigned “0”. An additive index 
was constructed that ranges from a 0 (no correct answers) 
to a 5 (M = 2.40, SD = 1.54, KR-20 = .611). The reliability 
of all four item scales was assessed, however, the best 
four item reliability was (KR-20 = .606).  
 Candidate personal knowledge. To evaluate candidate 
personal knowledge, respondents were asked seven open-ended 
questions concerning the 2004 presidential and vice-
presidential candidates and their families. The items were 
selected to represent personal knowledge about the 
candidates and their families. The topics included 
identifying the candidate who “flip-flopped” on the Iraq 
War resolution (70.1% correctly identified Senator John 
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Kerry), the candidate who served in the National Guard 
during the Vietnam War (45.9% correctly identified 
President George W. Bush), the candidate known for 
misspoken words and sentences (76.9% correctly identified 
President George W. Bush), and the candidate who received 
multiple purple hearts during his Vietnam War service (74% 
correctly identified Senator John Kerry). The topics also 
included two questions that addressed which vice-
presidential candidate was the former C.E.O. of Halliburton 
(55.6% correctly identified Dick Cheney) and a former trial 
lawyer (56.8% correctly identified Senator John Edwards). 
The final question asked which presidential candidate’s 
wife is the heiress to the Heinz ketchup fortune (67.7% 
correctly identified Teresa Kerry). Correct answers were 
assigned “1” and incorrect answers were assigned “0”. An 
additive index was constructed with respondents ranging 
from a 0 (no correct answers) to a 7 (M = 4.47, SD = 2.13, 
KR-20 = .773). The reliability of a six item scale was 
assessed, however, the removal of an item (misstatements by 
President George Bush) failed to improve reliability (KR-20 
= .770). 
Political discussion. To assess political discussion, 
respondents were asked the number of days they talked about 
politics.  A single item was created with response 
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categories ranging from 0 (never), 1 day to 7 days (M = 
2.6, SD = 1.97). 
Information processing strategies. To assess the 
respondent’s information processing strategies of late 
night television talk shows and political comedy programs, 
respondents were asked seven items measuring their 
selective scanning, active processing, and reflective 
integration.  
Selective scanning measures the frequency of a 
respondent’s “flipping” either the television channel or 
the newspaper’s page seeking content that is appealing.  
Two items were used to assess selective scanning: Do late 
night television talk shows/political comedy programs give 
me to much useless information? When watching late night 
television talk shows/political comedy programs, I only pay 
attention if there is something that catches my interest. 
These items had response categories ranging from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly agree). A mean index 
was created for selective scanning (M = 3.01, SD = .324, 
Cronbach’s alpha = .55).  
Three items assessed active processing and two items 
assessed reflective integration. Respondent’s were asked 
whether they sought additional information following 
interaction with late night television talk shows and 
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political comedy programs, whether respondent’s recalled 
and thought about information learned on late night talk 
shows and political comedy programs later, and whether 
respondents share the information with other individuals. 
These items replace traditional media with late night 
television talk shows and political comedy programs 
(Kosicki & McLeod, 1990; Sotirovic & McLeod, 2001).   
A mean index was created for active processing with 
response categories ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 
10 (strongly agree) (M = 4.31, SD = 1.87 , Cronbach’s alpha 
= .780). A mean index was created for reflective 
integration with response categories ranging from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly agree) (M = 3.94, SD = 
.386, Cronbach’s alpha = .796). A mean index was then 
created for active reflection, a combination of active 
processing and reflective integration, to tap into the 
active information processing strategies, as well as the 
interpersonal conversations that one has about the 
programs’ content. A mean index was created combining 
active processing and reflective integration. This index, 
active reflection, was constructed which varied from 0 – 
100 (M = 4.16, SD = 1.87, Cronbach’s alpha = .877). 
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Predictor Variables 
 Media exposure and attention items were employed to 
assess respondents’ global use of media and to assess the 
degree of attention paid to the programming. Media effects 
scholars argue that “exposure items alone clearly 
understate the case for television’s effect” (Chaffee & 
Schleuder, 1986; p. 103; see also McLeod & McDonald, 1985). 
Chaffee and Schleuder further argued that assessing media 
attention “can reduce the spurious influence of third 
variables on tests of cognitive effects” (p. 103). Thus, 
the combination of media exposure and attention measures 
more fully capture a respondents use and cognitive 
application of the media employed for informational or 
entertainment purposes. 
 Broadcast news. Eveland & Scheufele (2000) noted in 
their study of news media use and political knowledge that 
no agreed upon standardized measure of media use exist. In 
this study, to assess broadcast news use, respondents were 
asked a series of media exposure and attention questions. 
Respondents were asked about their exposure and attention 
levels to national network news, national cable news (CNN, 
FOX, or MSNBC, morning news programs (Today, Good Morning 
America), news magazine shows (60 Minutes, Dateline, 20/20, 
Prime Time Live, 48 Hours, Now with Bill Moyers), and the 
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Sunday morning talk shows. A mean index was created for 
broadcast media exposure with response categories ranging 
from 0 (never watch), and 1 (not very often) to 10 (very 
often) (M =2.78, SD = 1.95, Cronbach’s alpha = .716). A 
mean index was also created for broadcast media attention 
with response categories ranging from 0 (never pay 
attention), and 1 (pay attention a little) to 10 (pay 
attention a lot) (M = 3.33, SD = 2.24, Cronbach’s alpha = 
.756). Then a multiplicative index was created combining 
broadcast media exposure and broadcast media attention 
measures; categories ranged from 0 - 100.00 (M = 17.15, SD 
= 16.21, Cronbach’s alpha = .858). 
 Newspapers. To assess newspaper use, respondents were 
asked a series of exposure and attention questions. 
Respondents were asked about their exposure and attention 
level to international and world news, terrorism and the 
war in Iraq, national government, and politics and the 
presidential election. A mean index was created for 
newspaper media exposure with response categories ranging 
from 0 (never read), and 1 (not very often) to 10 (very 
often) (M =3.51, SD = 3.09, Cronbach’s alpha = .954). A 
mean index was also created for newspaper media attention 
with response categories ranging from 0 (never pays 
attention), and 1 (pay attention a little) to 10 (pay 
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attention a lot) (M = 3.90, SD = 3.32, Cronbach’s alpha = 
.959). Then a multiplicative index was created combining 
newspaper media exposure and newspaper media attention 
measures; categories ranged from 0 - 100.00 (M = 24.26, SD 
= 27.30, Cronbach’s alpha = .977). 
 Late night television talk shows. To assess late night 
television talk show programming use, respondents were 
asked an exposure and attention question regarding viewing 
the Late Show with David Letterman and the Tonight Show 
with Jay Leno. A mean index was created for late night 
television talk show exposure with response categories 
ranging from 0 (never watch), and 1 (not very often) to 10 
(very often) (M=4.02, SD= 3.08). A mean index was also 
created for late night talk show attention with response 
categories ranging from 0 (pay attention a little), and 1 
(never pay attention) to 10 (pay attention a lot) (M = 
4.56, SD = 3.21). Table 1 presents a frequency distribution 
of late night talk show exposure and attention data. A 
multiplicative index was then created combining late night 
talk show media exposure and late night talk show attention 
measures; categories ranged from 0 - 100.00 (M = 26.52, SD 
= 27.52, Cronbach’s alpha = .904). 
 Political comedy programs. To assess political comedy 
show programming use, respondents were asked an exposure 
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and attention question regarding the Daily Show with Jon 
Stewart and Real Time with Bill Maher. A mean index was 
created for political comedy show exposure with response 
categories ranging from 0 (never watch), and 1 (not very 
often) to 10 (very often) (M = 1.24, SD = 1.96). A mean 
index was also created for political comedy show attention 
with response categories ranging from 0 (never pay 
attention), and 1 (pay attention a little) to 10 (pay 
attention a lot) (M = 1.41, SD = 2.33). Table 2 presents a 
frequency distribution of political comedy program exposure 
and attention data.  A multiplicative index was then 
created combining political comedy show media exposure and 
political comedy show attention measures; categories ranged 
from 0 - 100.00 (M = 7.83, SD = 16.52, Cronbach’s alpha = 
.825). 
 Control variables. A number of exogenous control 
variables were introduced in the analysis. Similar controls 
were introduced for studies concerning media use and voter 
learning (Leshner & McKean, 1997; Weaver & Drew, 2001). The 
control measures included age (M = 23.06, SD = 7.68) and 
sex (60.7% - female), and the respondent’s university 
classification as a proxy measure for education level. 
University classification was created with response 
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categories ranging from 1 (freshman) to 5 (5th year senior) 
and 6(graduate student) (M = 2.55, SD = 1.56).  
This study also used demographic information about the 
respondent’s family. Parental education level was a single-
item measure created with response categories ranging from 
1 (less than high school), 2 (high school graduate), 3 
(some college), 4 (college graduate) to 5 (Graduate/ 
Professional School) (M = 2.85, SD = .983). Respondent’s 
also identified the number of books in their parent’s 
household. The number of books item represents household 
material possessions and is a proxy measure for family 
wealth. A mean index was created with response categories 
ranging from 1 (none), 2 (1 - 10 books), 3 (11 - 50 books), 
4 (51 - 100 books), 5 (101 – 200 books), 6 (More than 200 
books) (M = 3.89, SD = 1.38). In health literature these 
controls have been utilized to capture an individual or 
family’s prestige (educational attainment) and financial 
resources (material goods) (Krieger, Williams, & Moss, 
1997). 
 To measure political interest, respondents were asked 
about national issues and politics, the 2004 presidential 
campaign, the war in Iraq, and the Oklahoma U.S. Senate and 
U.S. House elections. These political interest items were 
measured with response categories ranging from 1 (I am not 
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at all interested) to 10 (I am very interested). A mean 
index was created for political interest (M = 6.83, SD = 
2.16, Cronbach’s alpha = .808).  
 To measure strength of political ideology, respondents 
were asked to specify their ideological leanings. Ideology 
items were measured with response categories ranging from 0 
(don’t know), 1 (moderate), 2 (slightly liberal, slightly 
conservative), 3 (liberal, conservative), 4 (ultra-liberal, 
ultra-conservative) (M = 1.74, SD = 1.28).  
Analysis 
 After indices were constructed and alpha reliabilities 
determined, data analysis was conducted in stages. The 
analysis was conducted by employing multiple regression. 
Before the multiple regression analysis, the data were 
analyzed to determine if they fulfilled the assumptions of 
multiple regression. The assumptions include the absence of 
outliers, multicollinearity, normality, linearity, and 
heteroscedascity of residuals (Cohen & Cohen, 1983; 
Pedhazur, 1997; Tabachnick & Fidell, 1989). No major 
violations of the assumptions were discovered, thus no 
action was taken. 
 Predictors of media use and political interest were 
examined. Multiple regression equations were then employed 
to examine the relationship between late night television 
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talk shows and political comedy programs and the outcome 
variables: general political knowledge, candidate personal 
knowledge, civic participation, political participation, 
likelihood of voting political discussion, and political 
cynicism. Following regression computation, B and beta 
weights were examined to assess how each predictor variable 
contributed to explaining the criterion variable.  
 Predictors of information processing strategies were 
also examined. Regression was then employed to measure the 
mediation, or indirect effect of active reflection on 
selected criterion variables: general political knowledge, 
candidate personal knowledge, civic participation and 
political participation. Baron and Kenny (1986) suggest 
that there are three steps for establishing mediation. In 
each step the coefficients were estimated and tested for 
significance. First, the late night television talk shows 
and political comedy programs were examined to determine 
their relationship with the outcome variables: general 
political knowledge, candidate personal knowledge, civic 
participation, and political participation. This is the 
direct effect.  If there was a direct effect, this 
relationship suggested that mediation was possible. Next, 
the mediator variable was established as the criterion 
variable. The significance of the effect was estimated 
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between the predictor variable and the mediator variable. 
This is signified by path a (See Figure 1). When path a was 
significant, the third step was conducted to test whether 
the mediator variable was a significant predictor of the 
outcome or criterion variable. This is specified by path b 
(see Figure 1). The control variables were included in the 
analysis of part a and b. Baron and Kenny specify that the 
path must be significant in each of the three steps for 
mediation to occur.  
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Chapter Four 
Results 
 This chapter consists of five parts. First, the 
chapter offers an analysis of the antecedents of media use. 
The chapter then offers an exploration of the antecedents 
of political interest. Regression equations are then 
analyzed to determine late night television talk shows and 
political comedy programs’ contribution to the following 
cognitive outcomes: political cynicism, general political 
knowledge, and candidate personal knowledge. Also, 
regression equations are analyzed to determine whether late 
night television talk shows and political comedy programs 
significantly contribute to the following behavioral 
outcomes: civic participation, political participation, and 
likelihood of voting. Finally, the analysis of active 
reflection are conducted to determine the mediation role of 
these information processing strategies in predicting 
general political knowledge, candidate personal knowledge, 
civic participation, and political participation. 
Antecedents of Media Use 
 Before testing the hypothesis, an analysis of the 
antecedents of media use was conducted to describe the 
respondents’ media exposure and attention to late night 
television talk shows, political comedy programs, broadcast 
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news, and newspapers. This was done to better understand 
this sample of young voters’ exposure and attention to the 
various media. Viewing late night television talk shows, 
political comedy programs, and broadcast news exposure and 
attention were significantly associated with age (Table 3 
and 4). Younger respondents watched significantly more late 
night television talk shows (β = -.282, p < .001) and 
political comedy programs (β = -.124, p < .05). Older 
respondents watched significantly more broadcast news (β = 
.210, p < .001). Sex differences revealed that men read 
newspapers (β = .094, p < .01), watched political comedy 
programs (β = .222, p < .001) and late night television 
talk shows (β = .096, p < .05) significantly more than 
women. Women watched significantly more broadcast news (β = 
-.178, p < .001) than men.  
 A respondent’s student classification contributed 
significantly to watching broadcast news (β = .134, p < 
.01). Family wealth did not significantly contribute to any 
form of media use.  
 A person’s interest in politics also contributed to 
media use. Political interest contributed significantly to 
newspaper reading (β = .391, p < .001), broadcast news (β = 
.116, p < .05), and approached significance in predicting 
exposure and attention of late night television talk shows 
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(β = .116, p < .10). A weaker orientation to one’s 
political ideology also approached significance with regard 
to exposure and attention to broadcast news (β = -.074, p < 
.10). Political discussions also contributed significantly 
to media consumption. People who engaged in political 
discussions were more inclined to read newspapers (β = 
.131, p < .01), watch broadcast news (β = .093, p < .10), 
and watch political comedy programs (β = .292, p < .001). 
 Reading the newspaper significantly contributed to 
watching broadcast news (β = .212, p < .001), although 
watching broadcast news also significantly contributed to 
reading newspapers (β = .206, p < .001). Watching late 
night television talk shows also significantly contributed 
to watching broadcast news (β = .292, p < .001). Watching 
late night television talk shows significantly contributed 
to watching political comedy programs (β = .105, p < .05), 
and watching political comedy programs significantly 
contributed to watching late night television talk shows (β 
= .105, p < .05). 
Antecedents of Political Interest 
 An analysis of the antecedents was conducted to 
determine what factors contributed to political interest. 
This analysis is important as political interest was a 
consistent predictor of outcomes, including general 
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political knowledge, candidate personal knowledge, 
likelihood of voting, and political discussion. As 
indicated in Table 5, older students have significantly 
more political interest than younger students (β = .089, p 
< .05). Sex and student classification had no significant 
impact on political interest. Having parents with higher 
educations also approached significance in contributing to 
levels of political interest (β = .073, p < .10), yet 
family wealth did not contribute in any significant way.  
 Engaging in political discussion was found to be a 
significant contributor to interest in politics (β = .418, 
p < .001). Strength of ideology also approached 
significance in contributing to political interest (β = 
.065, p < .10).  
 Traditional media exposure and attention also 
contributed significantly to political interest. Watching 
broadcast news significantly contributed to political 
interest (β = .094, p < .05). People who read newspapers 
were also more politically interested than those who did 
not (β = .325, p < .001). Finally, exposure and attention 
to late night television talk shows contributed 
significantly to political interest (β = .072, p < .10), 
but political comedy programs made no significant 
contribution. 
 102 
Political Cynicism 
 Hypothesis 1 and 2 examine the relationship between 
late night television talk shows, political comedy programs 
and political cynicism. Table 6 indicates that this model 
achieved a level of significance F(12, 388) = 1.58, p < 
.10. The percentage of variance accounted for between late 
night television talk shows and political comedy programs 
and the criterion variable political cynicism approached 
significance R2 = .047, p < .10. 
 Political cynicism was significantly higher among 
older respondents (β = .134, p < .05). Table 6 also shows 
that sex, student classification, and parental effects all 
failed to significantly influence political cynicism. 
Political interest and strength of ideology also made no 
significant contribution to political cynicism.  
 Heavy exposure and attention to television news and 
newspapers did not have a significant impact on political 
cynicism. In examining Table 6, the coefficient estimate 
shows that late night television talk shows also failed to 
significantly predict political cynicism (β = .019, p < 
.738). Therefore, H1 is not supported. In examining the 
impact of political comedy programs it was found that heavy 
exposure and attention contributed significantly to 
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political cynicism (β = .131, p < .05). Therefore, H2 is 
supported. 
Civic Participation 
The civic participation measure explored a 
respondent’s involvement in membership oriented, community 
activities, such as sports, religious activities, drama 
organizations, and group volunteering. For the criterion 
variable civic participation, Table 7 displays the control 
and the predictor variables. The model showed a level of 
significance F(12, 388) = 2.57, p < .01. The percentage of 
variance accounted for between late night television talk 
shows and political comedy programs and the criterion 
variable civic participation was R2 = .074, p < .01.  
Younger college students were significantly more 
likely to engage in civic participation (β = -.152, p < 
.05). Females were significantly more inclined to engage in 
civic participation than were men (β = -.123, p < .05). A 
respondent’s educational classification did not 
significantly contribute to civic participation. Also, 
political interest and the strength of a person’s political 
ideology did not significantly affect civic participation. 
In controlling for parental effects, neither the parent’s 
education level nor the family’s wealth significantly 
contributed to levels of civic participation. 
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Exploring media use variables; Table 7 displays that 
broadcast news and newspaper news failed to achieve 
significance in predicting civic participation. 
 In assessing the contribution of late night television 
talk shows on civic participation, it was hypothesized that 
heavy viewers of late night television talk shows would 
positively predict civic participation. H3 was not 
supported. The regression coefficients in Table 7 specify 
that no significant relationship exists between late night 
television shows and civic participation (β = .040, p = 
.466). The fourth hypothesis specified that more viewing of 
political comedy programs would positively predict civic 
participation. This hypothesis, too, failed to reach 
significance. Table 7 reveals that political comedy 
programs made no significant contribution to civic 
participation (β = -.026, p = .641). 
Political Participation 
The political participation measure explored levels of 
political activity such as attendance at political rallies, 
letter writing to the editor, participating in human rights 
and environmental organizations, collecting money for a 
social cause, and participating in student government. The 
multiple regression model for political participation 
showed a level of significance F(12, 388) = 5.10, p < .001. 
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The percentage of variance accounted for between late night 
television talk shows and political comedy programs and the 
criterion variable political participation was R2 = .136, p 
< .001.  
As can be seen in Table 8, three control variables 
predicted political participation. Younger respondents were 
significantly more likely to engage in political 
participation (β = -.154, p < .01). Sex made no significant 
contribution to political participation, however, a 
respondent’s student classification strongly predicted 
participation in political activities (β = .145, p < .01). 
Those who engaged in political discussions were 
significantly more inclined to participate in political 
activities (β = .236, p < .001). 
This model also shows how media use variables 
contributed to political participation. As indicated in 
Table 8, broadcast news and newspaper news failed to 
achieve significance in predicting political participation. 
The fifth hypothesis stated that greater viewing of 
late night television talk shows would positively predict 
political participation. The model shows no significant 
relationship between late night television talk shows and 
political participation (β = .047, p = .376). Thus, H5 was 
not supported. The sixth hypothesis concerned the greater 
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viewing of political comedy programs and the prediction of 
political participation. H6, too, failed to reach 
significance. As Table 8 shows, political comedy programs 
indicate a negative, although non-significant, relationship 
(β = -.023, p = .665). 
Likelihood of Voting 
 The seventh and eighth hypotheses are concerned with 
late night television talk shows and political comedy 
programs contribution to likelihood of voting. Overall, the 
model did show a level of significance F(12, 388) = 6.47, p 
< .001 and the squared multiple correlations (R2) indicate 
that the model accounts for 16% of the variance in voter 
likelihood. Table 9 reveals that age, sex, and student 
classification all fail to significantly impact voter 
likelihood. Parental effects also failed to significantly 
influence voter likelihood. 
 Those individuals who are interested in politics, 
however, are also significantly more inclined to vote (β = 
.378, p < .001). Political ideology and political 
discussion did not significantly affect voter likelihood. 
Table 9 also shows that broadcast news and newspaper 
news failed to achieve significance in predicting 
likelihood of voting. Additionally, there were no 
significant relationships between late night television 
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talk shows (β = -.010, p = .845) or political comedy 
programs (β = -.021, p = .692) and voter likelihood. Both 
H7 and H8 failed to reach significance. 
 In summary, age was a recurring variable accounting 
for younger respondents engaging in civic and political 
participation. Late night television talk shows and 
political comedy programs failed to significantly predict 
civic participation, political participation, or the 
likelihood of voting. 
General Political Knowledge 
 To provide a full understanding of the relationship 
between late night television talk shows and political 
comedy programs on general political knowledge, an 
examination of control variables is instructive. Table 10 
displays the control and predictor variables for general 
political knowledge.  Overall, the model was significant 
F(12, 388) = 10.64, p < .001 and the model accounts for a 
considerable amount of the variance of general political 
knowledge (R2 = .245, p < .001).  
 The model showed that the respondent’s age and sex did 
not have a significant impact on general political 
knowledge. The respondent’s educational classification also 
failed to significantly contribute to general political 
knowledge. The model does show, however, that the strength 
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of a person’s political ideology significantly predicted 
general political knowledge (β = .227, p < .001).  
In controlling for parental effects, it was determined 
that a parent’s education level did not significantly 
contribute to general political knowledge, but family 
wealth does (β = .098, p < .05). Political interest, too, 
contributed significantly to general political knowledge (β 
= .140, p < .05), yet political discussion failed to 
contribute significantly to general political knowledge. 
Media use was also examined to determine the 
contributing relationship between broadcast news and 
newspaper exposure and attention and general political 
knowledge. The model showed that neither broadcast news nor 
newspaper exposure and attention contributed significantly 
to general political knowledge. 
 The ninth hypothesis specified that greater viewing of 
late night television talk shows would positively predict 
general political knowledge. An examination of the 
regression coefficient indicates no significant 
relationship between late night talk shows and general 
political knowledge (β = .003, p = .948). The tenth 
hypothesis suggested that greater viewing of political 
comedy programs would positively predict general political 
knowledge. This hypothesis was strongly supported. As 
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indicated in Table 10, political comedy programs are 
significant predictors of general political knowledge (β = 
.185, p < .001).   
Candidate Personal Knowledge 
 As indicated in Table 11, the control and predictor 
variables for candidate personal knowledge. The model was 
significant F(12, 388)= 17.79, p < .001 and the squared 
multiple correlations (R2) indicate that the model accounts 
for 35% of the variance in candidate personal knowledge.  
A number of control variables strongly predicted 
candidate personal knowledge. Candidate personal knowledge 
is significantly higher among older respondents (β = .190, 
p < .001). Men were significantly more knowledgeable about 
candidate personal knowledge than were women (β = .158, p < 
.001). A respondent’s student classification did not 
contribute significantly to candidate personal knowledge. 
The strength of the individual’s political ideology also 
failed to achieve levels of significance in predicting 
candidate personal knowledge. In controlling for parental 
effects on candidate personal knowledge, neither a parent’s 
educational level nor their family wealth contributed 
significantly to candidate personal knowledge. 
Interest in politics was a significant predictor of 
candidate personal knowledge (β = .220, p < .001). Having 
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political discussions also significantly predicted 
candidate personal knowledge (β = .194, p < .001). 
Traditional media use was not a significant 
contributor to candidate personal knowledge, as both 
broadcast news and newspaper news both failed to 
significantly predict candidate personal knowledge. 
 The eleventh hypothesis stated that heavy viewers of 
late night television talk shows would positively predict 
candidate personal knowledge. This hypothesis was 
supported. As indicated in Table 11, late night television 
talk shows significantly predicted candidate personal 
knowledge (β = .106, p < .05). Additionally, the twelfth 
hypothesis suggested that greater viewing of political 
comedy programs would positively predict candidate personal 
knowledge. This hypothesis, too, was supported. Exposure 
and attention to political comedy programs enhanced 
candidate personal knowledge (β = .117, p < .05). 
 In summary, while numerous control variables made 
contributions to general political knowledge and candidate 
personal knowledge, political interest was as a significant 
predictor of both criterion variables. Late night 
television talk shows made no significant contribution to 
general political knowledge, but were a predictor of 
candidate personal knowledge during the 2004 presidential 
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election. Political comedy programs were found to enhance 
both general political knowledge and candidate personal 
knowledge. 
Political Discussion 
 This study is also concerned with late night 
television talk shows and political comedy programs’ 
contribution to political discussion. This model showed a 
level of significance F(11, 389) = 29.60, p < .001 and the 
model accounts for a considerable amount of the variance of 
political discussion (R2 = .456, p < .001). 
 Age and sex had no significant impact on engaging in 
political discussion (Table 12). Student classification 
also had no significant impact on the frequency of 
political discussion. A parent’s education level failed to 
significantly influence political discussion, but a 
family’s wealth significantly influenced the frequency of 
political discussion (β = .089, p < .05). 
 Persons with a stronger orientation toward their 
political ideology were also more inclined to engage in 
political discussion (β = .097, p < .05). Political 
interest was also a significant predictor of political 
discussion (β = 459, p < .001).  
 In exploring media use variables, it was determined 
that heavy exposure and attention to television news was 
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not a predictor of frequency of political discussion. 
However, reading a newspaper was a significant predictor (β 
= .120, p < .05). 
 Hypothesis 13 stated that greater viewing of late 
night television talk shows would positively predict 
political discussion. As indicated in Table 12, the 
regression coefficient for late night television talk shows 
failed to reach significance (β = -.054, p < .203). Thus, 
H13 was rejected. Hypothesis 14 stated that viewing 
political comedy programs would positively predict 
political discussion. This hypothesis was strongly 
supported by the regression coefficients. As Table 12 
shows, political comedy programs were significant 
predictors of political discussion (β = .200, p < .001). 
Test of Mediation 
 In addition to examining direct effects, this study 
also explored whether the information processing strategy 
active reflection mediated the relationships between the 
predictor variables late night television talk shows and 
political comedy programs and the criterion variables 
general political knowledge, candidate personal knowledge, 
civic participation and political participation.  
As a reminder, Baron and Kenny (1986) explained that 
three different steps are necessary for mediation to occur 
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(see Figure 1). The first procedure is to establish the 
direct effect. Once it is determined that the predictor 
variables (X) significantly predicts the criterion variable 
(Y), mediation is possible. The second step is to establish 
the mediator variable as an outcome variable. For mediation 
to occur, it must be shown that X significantly predicts 
the mediator variable (M). The final step is to determine 
whether the mediator variable (M) significantly predicts 
the criterion variable (Y), while controlling for the 
predictor variables (X). Baron and Kenny specify that their 
must be a significant effect in each of the three steps for 
mediation to occur. 
No significant relationship was found between late 
night television talk shows and general political 
knowledge, therefore the hypothesis concerning whether 
active reflection would mediate the relationship was not 
confirmed (H15a). No significant relationships were found 
between late night television talk shows and political 
comedy programs and the criterion variables civic 
participation or political participation, so the hypotheses 
concerning whether active reflection would mediate these 
relationships were also not confirmed (H 15c, H 15d, H 16c, 
and H 16d).   
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 The remaining mediation hypotheses (H 15b, H 16a, and 
H16b) are explored using the three steps outlined by Baron 
and Kenny. Hypothesis 15b stated that active reflection 
would mediate the relationship between late night 
television talk shows and candidate personal knowledge. In 
hypothesis 15b, an assessment of the first regression 
equation (hypothesis eleven, see Figure 2) shows that late 
night television talk shows predicted candidate personal 
knowledge (ß = .106, p < .05). In Figure 2, the second 
equation shows that late night television talk shows were 
significant predictors of active reflection (ß = .296, p < 
.001). Table 13 shows the beta weights for the final step 
of mediation. The final regression equation in Figure 2 
depicts that engaging in active reflection did not 
significantly contribute to candidate personal knowledge (ß 
= .022, p < .654). As such hypothesis 15b fails to be 
confirmed. Active reflection fails to achieve significance 
in mediating the relationship between late night television 
talk shows and candidate personal knowledge. 
 Hypothesis 16a stated that active reflection would 
mediate the relationship between political comedy programs 
and general political knowledge. The regression 
coefficients for the first equation (hypothesis ten, see 
Figure 3) show that political comedy programs were 
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significantly predictive of general political knowledge (ß 
= .185, p < .001). In Figure 3, the second equation shows 
political comedy programs were strongly predictive of 
active reflection (ß = .234, p < .001). Yet, the final 
equation fails to achieve significance (see Figure 3). 
Table 13 shows that active reflection is not a significant 
predictor of general political knowledge (ß = -.044, p < 
.412). Hypothesis 16a is rejected. 
  Hypothesis 16b stated that active reflection will 
mediate the relationship between political comedy programs 
and candidate personal knowledge. The first regression 
equation (hypothesis twelve, see Figure 4) shows that 
exposure and attention to political comedy programs 
significantly contributed to candidate personal knowledge 
(ß = .117, p < .05). In Figure 4, people who watch 
political comedy programs also engage in late night 
television talk show and political comedy program active 
reflection (ß = .234, p < .001). The final equation, 
however, failed to reach significance (See Figure 4). Table 
13 shows that active reflection failed to significantly 
predict candidate personal knowledge (ß = .022, p < .654). 
Thus, active reflection failed to mediate the relationship 
between political comedy programs and candidate personal 
knowledge.  
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 In summary, it was hypothesized that active reflection 
would mediate the relationship between the predictor 
variables late night television talk shows and political 
comedy programs and the criterion variables general 
political knowledge and candidate personal knowledge. In 
each hypothesis, active reflection failed to mediate the 
relationship between the predictor and criterion variables.  
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Chapter 5 
Discussion 
Over 20 years ago, Neil Postman (1985) urged that 
“Entertainment is the supraideology of all discourse on 
television. No matter what is depicted or from what point 
of view, the overarching presumption is that it is there 
for our amusement and pleasure” (p. 87). Perhaps Postman 
foresaw the entertainment politics of today’s late night 
television talk shows and political comedy programs. Steve 
Allen, Jack Parr, and Johnny Carson certainly set the stage 
for today’s late night television talk show and political 
comedy program hosts to make fun of politician’s 
imperfections. Richard Nixon, John Kennedy, and Robert 
Kennedy did there share to establish the genre as a 
political outlet and enabled later presidential, 
senatorial, and gubernatorial candidates to appear on the 
Late Show with David Letterman, the Tonight Show with Jay 
Leno, and the Daily Show with Jon Stewart. 
As young people have increasingly self-reported 
learning about political candidates and campaigns from 
nontraditional news sources, such as late night television 
talk shows and political comedy programs (Pew Center, 2004, 
2000), this “blurring” of entertainment and politics has 
also caused much concern. Postman argued that television 
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programming disallows the audience from posing critical 
questions about the programming; to “reveal the act of 
thinking” is to undermine the content of the programming. 
In concerns over the cultivation effects of mass media, 
Gerbner, Gross, Morgan, and Signorielli (1980) argued that 
the exposure to television contributed to ways of thinking 
and acting. Putnam (2000, 1995) agreed, arguing that 
television diminished the social bonds of community. 
This investigation assesses the cultivation effects of 
late night television talk show and political comedy 
programs on political knowledge, citizen participation, and 
political cynicism. Few research studies prior to 2003 were 
concerned with late night television talk shows or 
political comedy programs’ contribution to political 
knowledge, these early studies examined daytime television 
talk shows and cable news talk programs such as CNN’s Larry 
King Live (Weaver & Drew, 1995, 2001; Drew & Weaver, 1998), 
an exception was a study of soft media and foreign policy 
and a 1992 study of traditional and nontraditional campaign 
media and political knowledge (Baum, 2003; Chaffee, et al., 
1994). Research on citizen participation had examined the 
contribution of various entertainment media, yet only 
recently examined the contribution of late night television 
talk shows (Moy, et al., 2005). There is a paucity of 
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research on political comedy programs such as the Daily 
Show with Jon Stewart and Real Time with Bill Maher and 
citizen participation. 
The premise of this research was that exposure and 
attention to late night television talk shows and political 
comedy programs contribute positively to general political 
knowledge, candidate personal knowledge, citizen 
participation, political discussion and political cynicism. 
The objective of this research was to determine if late 
night television talk shows and political comedy programs 
were sufficient media to stir the audience so that they 
might learn political information and engage in various 
forms of participation. This research was also concerned 
with whether the programs contributed to political 
cynicism. Finally, this research was concerned with whether 
active reflection, as an information processing strategy, 
might mediate the relationship between the programs and 
political knowledge and citizen participation. 
The following is a discussion of the results and their 
implications. This discussion is organized around the 
following cognitive outcomes: general political knowledge, 
candidate personal knowledge, and political cynicism. 
Additionally, the discussion is organized around the 
following behavioral outcomes: civic participation, 
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political participation, and likelihood of voting. This 
chapter will end with a discussion of the limitations to 
the study and offer direction for future research. 
A number of conclusions can be drawn from this 
research. First, late night television talk shows and 
political comedy programs should not be taken as a single 
unit of entertainment television. Each contributes to 
cognitive outcomes differently. For example, the findings 
show that watching political comedy programs contributed to 
general political knowledge and candidate personal 
knowledge, but watching late night television talk shows 
contributed only to candidate personal knowledge. Second, 
the findings show that watching political comedy programs 
contributed to levels of political cynicism. Watching late 
night television talk shows did not have this impact. In 
exploring behavioral outcomes, it was found that neither 
late night television talk shows nor political comedy 
programs were sufficient in information or appeal to 
contribute to civic participation, political participation, 
or voter likelihood. Third, the findings show that watching 
political comedy programs contributed to political 
discussion. Finally, active processing, the information 
processing strategy where one critically assesses 
information and then discusses the information with others, 
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was neither a significant mediator of the relationship 
between late night television talk shows and candidate 
personal knowledge, nor a significant mediator of the 
relationship between political comedy programs and general 
political knowledge and candidate personal knowledge. Late 
night television talk shows and political comedy programs, 
however, contributed significantly to active reflection 
Cognitive Outcomes 
Political cynicism. This research shows that watching 
political comedy programs contribute to political cynicism. 
Previous research, however, only indicate that late night 
television talk shows contribute to political cynicism (Moy 
& Pfau, 1999; Pfau, et al., 2001), because there is a 
paucity of research that examines the relationship between 
political comedy programs and political cynicism. Other 
research has examined the relationship between television 
hard news use, newspaper hard news use, and nontraditional 
media like radio talk shows and political advertisements. 
In previous research, it has been found that television 
hard news use and newspaper hard news use do not 
significantly contribute to political cynicism (Leshner & 
McKean, 1997; O’Keefe, 1980). So, this research seems 
rather consistent in finding that watching broadcast news 
and reading newspapers does not significantly contribute to 
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political cynicism. Recent research on traditional news 
media has focused on media content and how campaign 
coverage, policies, and so forth are framed; this research 
only examines the exposure and attention to various forms 
of media. Thus, any study of political cynicism may benefit 
from an examination of media exposure and attention coupled 
with a content analysis of the program in order to fully 
understand late night television talk shows and political 
comedy programs. Overall, the R2 shows that only 4.7% of the 
variance is accounted for in political cynicism. If the 
model for predicting political cynicism were improved by 
adding other demographic controls or communication 
variables, political comedy programs may fail to contribute 
significantly to political cynicism. Additionally, 
different political cynicism questions might allow for 
accounting for more variance, although the alpha level was 
relatively high at .724.  Nonetheless, this finding remains 
interesting because it further adds to our understanding of 
how political comedy programs contribute to the democratic 
process. 
Political knowledge. Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) 
operationally defined political knowledge “as the range of 
factual information about politics that is stored in long-
term memory” (p. 10). To this study, this definition is 
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important because it allows for an assessment of a wide 
range of political information. Media use and individual 
differences contributed to the political knowledge 
landscape in interesting ways. 
 Those who watched political comedy programs possessed 
different types of political information than those who 
watched late night television talk shows. Young voters’ 
media exposure and attention to political comedy programs 
contributed to general political knowledge. This finding 
was consistent with previous research conducted by the 
National Annenberg Election Survey (2004) and was highly 
expected as the purpose of political comedy programs is to 
offer humorous critiques of the government, political 
issues, and politicians (Jones, 2005). That political 
comedy programs contribute to general political knowledge 
is impressive given this study’s reliance on Delli Carpini 
and Keeter’s (1991) five-item general political systems 
measure to assess voter learning. Other studies have used 
surveillance measures in different knowledge domains such 
as party issue knowledge (Chaffee, et al., 1994) and 
candidate issue knowledge (Drew & Weaver, 1998; Weaver & 
Drew, 1995, 2001; McLeod, et al., 1996).  
 Previous studies on voter learning generally concluded 
that late night television talk shows contributed little to 
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political knowledge. This research, however, reasoned that 
because of the program genres increased attention during 
presidential election cycles individuals may learn 
political information from the programs. Late night 
television talk shows, however, did not contribute 
significantly to general political knowledge.  
 Late night television talk shows inability to 
contribute to general political knowledge is likely for 
several reasons, despite the increased attention that these 
programs receive as new and innovative forms of political 
communication. First, late night television talk shows have 
as their primary obligation the advancement of celebrity 
and their “cultural product” (Marshall, 1997). Despite the 
increasing frequency of political jokes and appearances by 
political candidates, politics remains an incidental 
component of the programs. Second, as Niven, Lichter, and 
Amundson (2003) explained the humor presented in these 
programs is primarily image and personality based. Thus, 
there is little opportunity to learn about anything other 
than the character or personality of the candidate or 
politician who is included in the joke. Third, when 
candidates appear on the programs their primary goal is to 
assert themselves as “regular guys,” thus further 
precluding substantive discussions between hosts and 
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candidates (Baum, 2003). Finally, Graber’s (2001) assertion 
that measures of general political systems knowledge are 
too hard and detached from the average person’s political 
knowledge needs may be especially relevant given a “new 
media” context where the primary discourse about politics 
is a humorous quip or monologue. This is especially 
relevant given Schudson’s (1998) critique of the “ideal 
informed citizen”. Again, despite the attention that 
political humor in late night television talk shows has 
received by journalist and scholars there continue to be 
few reasons to believe that the content is sufficient to 
influence general political systems knowledge. 
 Watching late night television talk shows and 
political comedy programs also contribute to higher levels 
of candidate personal knowledge. Late night television talk 
shows’ contribution to candidate personal knowledge is 
contrary to previous studies that examined candidate issue 
knowledge (Chaffee, et al., 1994). There are several 
possible explanations for this finding. First, Niven, 
Lichter, and Amundson (2003) explain that “late night 
comedy is predominantly directed at the executive branch, 
encompassing the president, major presidential candidates, 
[and] the first family . . .  .” (p. 130). This 
concentration and repetition may provide heavy viewers of 
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late night television talk shows a repository of ready 
“facts” about executive level politicians and presidential 
contenders. Additionally, Niven, Lichter, and Amundson, 
quoting Jon Stewart of the Daily Show, note that the key to 
comedy “is reducing these guys [politicians] to 
monosyllabic stereotypes” (p. 130). While for Jon Stewart 
the key to comedy maybe a stereotype, the key to the young 
voter’s candidate personal knowledge base may also be the 
reduction of the politician to a singular word or phrase 
that is associated with the individuals’ character, 
personality, previous work experience, war service, marital 
relationship, or public speaking ability. 
 Findings concerning late night television talk shows 
and political comedy programs’ contribution to general 
political knowledge and candidate personal knowledge are 
important for several reasons. First, the findings 
demonstrate that a blanket negative appraisal of 
nontraditional media’s contribution to political knowledge 
is unwarranted. Political comedy programs make a 
significant contribution to general political knowledge and 
candidate personal knowledge. Watching late night 
television talk shows strongly impact candidate personal 
knowledge.  
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 Additionally, this research notes the Pew Center 
(2000, 2004) studies that explain that young people self-
report learning about candidates. This study, like the Pew 
Center surveys, taps into respondents’ knowledge about 
candidate personal knowledge for both late night television 
talk shows and political comedy programs. While the Pew 
surveys indicate that people self-report learning, this 
study shows that both late night television talk shows and 
political comedy programs strongly contribute to candidate 
personal knowledge. 
 Finally, in considering late night television talk 
show and political comedy programs contributions to 
political knowledge it is important to keep in mind that 
there are differences in program structure and purpose. 
This may necessarily favor one program in contributing to 
either general political knowledge or candidate personal 
knowledge. As has been reported, the purpose of political 
comedy programming is markedly different from that of late 
night television talk shows. 
 This research also hypothesized that active 
reflection, an information processing strategy, would 
mediate the relationship between late night television talk 
shows and campaign knowledge. Additionally, it was 
hypothesized that active reflection would mediate the 
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relationship between political comedy shows and general 
political knowledge and candidate personal knowledge. 
Active reflection is an indicator of how the individual 
uses media to understand political information, 
“downplaying the effects of what media do in comparison 
with what individuals do to construct meaning” (Sotirovic & 
McLeod, 2001). Younger respondents who watch broadcast 
news, late night television talk shows, political comedy 
programs, and read newspapers actively reflect on the 
content of late night television talk shows and political 
comedy programs (See Table 14). Active reflection, however, 
did not contribute to general political knowledge or 
candidate issue knowledge. This finding is surprising 
considering Sotirovic and McLeod (2001) found that active 
reflection contributed to public affairs knowledge.  One 
possible explanation for active reflections inability to 
significantly contribute to general political knowledge and 
candidate issue knowledge is the measures for late night 
television talk show/political comedy program active 
reflection. These measures ask respondents if they consider 
late night television talk shows and political comedy 
programs in there thinking or discussions with others, yet 
the measure items do not prompt the respondent to consider 
political humor. Perhaps, prompting the respondent to 
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consider the political humor, in addition to the program, 
would present greater significance. The current measures 
for late night television talk show and political comedy 
program active processing closely resemble those used for 
news and information processing (Kosicki & McLeod, 1990; 
Sotirovic & McLeod, 2001).  
 Demographics, too, influenced general political 
knowledge and candidate personal knowledge in ways that 
were consistent with previous studies, but also in ways 
that were unexpected.  Like previous studies, age did not 
predict general political knowledge (Bennett & Rademacher, 
1997). The finding that age is a predictor of candidate 
personal knowledge is consistent with previous research on 
voter learning (Chaffee, et al., 1994), but other research 
concentrating on campaign issue knowledge found that age 
was not a significant predictor (Drew & Weaver, 1998; 
Weaver & Drew, 1995, 2001). 
 In this study, sex failed to significantly predict 
general political knowledge. While Chaffee, Zhao, and 
Leshner (1994) found that females possessed more candidate 
personal knowledge, this study notes that males knew more 
candidate personal knowledge than did females. The goal of 
this research was not to determine which sex was more 
knowledgeable, but to control for sex as a predictor of 
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general political knowledge and candidate personal 
knowledge. Nevertheless, it is surprising that sex makes no 
significant contribution given the historic relationship 
between sex and general knowledge (Bennett, 1994; Delli 
Carpini & Keeter, 1991; Verba, Burns, & Schlozman, 1997). 
 It is particularly interesting that student 
classification also failed to predict general political 
knowledge and candidate personal knowledge. While previous 
studies have found that young adults are not as 
knowledgeable as older adults, it is the younger adults 
that have most recently completed their high school 
educations. In this study, the measure of student 
classification recognizes that the respondents’ are 
matriculating through the higher education system. Further, 
Pascarella and Terenzini (1991) noted that attending 
college provides opportunity for increased public affairs 
knowledge. This is of particular interest because general 
political knowledge was assessed using “textbook” 
information and it is reasonable to expect that those who 
have most recently graduated from high school and who are 
actively pursuing advanced degrees would be particularly 
knowledgeable of “textbook” facts about politics. 
 Ostensibly, Jennings (1996) accounts for this 
phenomena explaining that a respondent’s knowledge of 
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“textbook” facts is “at its height . . . near graduation. 
Without the stimulation of continued tuition and testing, 
the ability to retrieve such facts at a moment’s notice 
diminishes considerably” (p. 234-235). One might surmise 
that these respondents are sufficiently removed from their 
high school civics classes and have not enrolled in 
collegiate level political science courses, or they have 
completed their political science courses and are now 
exhibiting declining levels of general political knowledge. 
The latter is what Jennings calls “forgetting curves in 
young adulthood” (p. 235). This study does not provide a 
testable explanation for this phenomenon, but notes that a 
student’s educational classification fails to significantly 
predict general political knowledge. 
 Socio-economic status predicted general political 
knowledge in ways that were mixed. Socio-economic status 
was included as a method to control for family influences 
as the sample was composed of young adult college students. 
Family wealth was a significant predictor of general 
political knowledge, but a parent’s educational level was 
not a significant predictor. Family wealth did not 
influence candidate issue knowledge; this is consistent 
with previous findings (Chaffee, et al., 1994). Previous 
research that combined measures of a person’s educational 
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attainment and income found that socio-economic status was 
a predictor of public affairs knowledge (McLeod & Perse, 
1994). This study’s findings differ, but only in the sense 
that socio-economic status was measured as individual 
items.  
 Political dispositions also influenced general 
political knowledge in ways that are consistent with 
previous studies. This study shows that individuals who are 
politically interested also possess more general political 
knowledge. This was expected as political interest has been 
a predictor of various political knowledge measures in 
studies of media use and voter learning since at least the 
1988 election cycle, with the exception of the 1996 
presidential election (Drew & Weaver, 1991, 1998; Weaver & 
Drew, 1995, 2001). Strength of ideology was also strongly 
associated with general political knowledge. Hollander 
(1995), too, found that strength of ideology was a 
predictor of political knowledge, although that study 
predicted campaign issue knowledge. Other studies, rather 
than utilizing ideology strength as a control, examined 
party label and their ability to predict campaign issue 
knowledge (Drew & Weaver, 1991, 1998; Weaver & Drew, 1995, 
2001).  
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Behavioral Outcomes 
Citizen participation. Gerbner and colleagues (1980) 
and Putnam (1995, 2000) have derided television for 
undermining people’s ability to create social bonds. This 
study focused on young voters who are more likely to have 
participated in some form of community service (Delli 
Carpini & Keeter, 1996), yet engage in political activities 
and voted less often than previous generational cohorts 
(Project Vote Smart, 1999; Putnam, 1995, 2000; Vanishing 
Voter, 2000).  
 The findings in this study show that watching late 
night television talk shows and political comedy programs 
make no significant contribution to civic participation, 
political participation, or voter likelihood. Recent 
research by Moy and colleagues (2005) found that late night 
television talk shows contributed to campaign 
participation, but did not significantly contribute to 
voter likelihood. Previous studies, however, have indicated 
that entertainment television, such as situation comedies; 
contribute little to participation (Shah, et al., 2001). 
Other studies have concentrated on television hard news and 
newspaper hard news use and citizen participation (Moy, et 
al., 1999; Scheufele, 2000, 2002). It has been explained 
that a key reason for situation comedies poor performance 
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in contributing to civic participation is the portrayal of 
a world “free of social controversy and value conflicts” 
(Shah, et al., 2001) .  
 Ostensibly, recognizing a problem’s existence, or 
conflict, is necessary for individuals to develop 
sufficient interest to engage in some form of 
participation. Shah, McLeod, and Yoon’s analysis 
effectively holds true for late night television talk shows 
that offer humorous ridicule of individual politicians, but 
offer little substantive policy content. The content is 
insufficient to encourage participation, unless the 
individual is already predisposed to participate in various 
civic and political activities. Moy, Xenos, and Hess (2005) 
offer this explanation “with respect to political activity, 
politically oriented content on late-night shows appears to 
be preaching to the choir” (p. 125).  
 Caution should be employed in interpreting the 
findings of political participation, civic participation, 
and voter likelihood. Several reasons justify this caution 
in interpretation. First, the R2 shows that only 7.4% of the 
variance is accounted for in civic participation, 13.6% in 
political participation, and 16.7% in voter likelihood. 
These low R2 values are indicators of a poor fitting model 
that only explains a small amount of variance. Second, the 
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reliability level for both political participation (KR-20 = 
.523) and civic participation (KR-20 = .537) were low. As 
such, better questions to capture a broader range of civic 
and political participation may have improved the ability 
to account for greater variance in both forms of 
participation. Additionally, including a broader set of 
control variables, such as including church attendance, may 
have improved the ability to account for more variance in 
each of the participation variables (Putnam, 2000). 
  This research shows that people who watch political 
comedy programs are more inclined to participate in 
political discussions. This finding is noteworthy for 
several reasons. First, it is argued that political 
discussions are a form of political participation, thus it 
can be argued that political comedy programs make a 
contribution to participatory democracy (Delli Carpini, et 
al., 2004). Second, given political comedy programs 
contribution to general political knowledge, candidate 
personal knowledge, and political discussion researchers 
have further reason to study the Daily Show with Jon 
Stewart and Real Time with Bill Maher. 
Theoretical Contribution 
 Cultivation theory established the theoretical 
framework for this research. Gerbner (1969, 1976) argued 
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that due to the ubiquitous nature of television, 
individuals internalize programming and that an audiences’ 
social reality becomes reflective of that mediated reality. 
Recognizing the inherent limitations of cultivation theory 
(Potter & Chang, 1990), this research examined specific 
programming to determine their contributions to cognitive 
and behavioral outcomes.  
If Gerbner’s “mean world” hypothesis is taken to mean 
that television’s effects are negative toward various 
outcomes, then this research presents decidedly mixed 
findings. As predictor variables, late night television 
talk shows and political comedy programs contribute to 
knowledge differently. It has been shown that political 
comedy programs contribute to a fuller range of political 
knowledge than do late night television talk shows. 
Ostensibly, it might be argued that both political comedy 
programs and late night television talk shows contribute 
positively to the “thriving democracy” debate. The 
programs, however, contribute to textbook and surveillance 
oriented political knowledge differently. Little in this 
research is suggestive that exposure and attention to late 
night television talk shows and political comedy programs 
suppress political knowledge.  
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In her examination of civic participation, Norris 
(1996) argued that the viewers’ program selection should be 
disentangled from more pervasive viewing patterns. This 
research acts on that advice by examining two 
nontraditional forms of political information. This 
research does not demonstrate that late night television 
talk shows or political comedy programs contribute 
significantly to civic participation, political 
participation, or voter likelihood. Yet, political programs 
contribute significantly to political discussion. With 
respect to cultivation theory, researchers should use 
caution in applying the “mean world” analogy to political 
comedy programs. While engaging in political discussion may 
require less effort than other forms of participation, 
political discussion is recognized as a contributor to the 
health of democracy (Barber, 1984; Dewey 1927; Habermas, 
1996; Page, 1996). As explained earlier, it remains 
important to recognize the content presented in late night 
television talk shows and political comedy programs may be 
insufficient to generate participation that requires great 
effort.  
Limitations 
This research is subject to several limitations. 
Regression analyses reveal significant relationships 
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between predictor and outcome variables, however the 
statistical tests in no way allow for statements about 
causation. Tabachnick and Fidell (1989) explain that 
causation is a “logical and experimental, rather than a 
statistical, problem” (p. 127). In a causal relationship 
the two variables (X) and (Y) must be correlated. 
Additionally, Tabachnick and Fidell explained that the 
predictor variable (X) identified in the research must 
precede (Y) in that exposure and attention to media precede 
the outcomes. Finally, X must contribute to the strength of 
relationships with outcome variable (Y), and no other 
unknown variable should be able to explain the relationship 
between X and Y (nonspuriousness). This research explains 
the significance of the relationships between various media 
exposure and attention and the outcome variables: general 
political knowledge, candidate personal knowledge, civic 
participation, political participation, and political 
cynicism. Yet, this research is limited because of an 
inability to explain the time order relationship between X 
and Y. Additionally, while a set of control variables were 
introduced to this analysis, not all possible controls 
variables were accounted for in the multiple regression 
analysis. So, this research is unable to account for all 
rival explanations on the outcome variable (Y). 
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This research would have also benefited from a random 
sample of young voters. As such, the second limitation 
concerns the sample composition. This research was 
conducted with a non random single-cross sectional sampling 
of students enrolled in freshman and sophomore level 
general education courses at a small, regional Oklahoma 
university. As the sample was not randomly derived, the 
findings are not generalizable to the larger population. 
This research concerned young voters and isolating a sample 
at a university allows for a concentration on youth, but 
the non random sample does not account for all individuals 
in a population and afford equal chance of being included. 
Also, the population from which this sample was drawn has a 
poverty level 8% higher than the national average and is 
predominantly Caucasian and American Indian yet is only 
1.9% below the national average for holding a Bachelor’s 
degree or higher (U.S. Census Bureau, 2002). Additionally, 
because those participating in the research were students, 
the findings are further limited to individuals who have 
achieved a specific level of education. 
 Another limitation of this study concerns the measure 
of political knowledge. This study measures general 
political knowledge and candidate personal knowledge as a 
form of candidate personal knowledge. The selection of 
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knowledge measures was initially preferred because content 
analysis studies indicate that 75% of the humor on late 
night television talk shows is directed at the politician’s 
character or personality and only 14% of the host’s wit is 
directed at political issues (Nitz, Cypher, Reichert, & 
Mueller, 2003; Niven, Lichter, & Amundson, 2003). The 
inclusion of campaign issue knowledge, however, would have 
provided a fuller understanding of the respondent’s 
political knowledge ranging from the processes of 
government, candidate biographical information, and 
campaign issue knowledge. The inclusion of campaign issue 
knowledge would also have allowed for greater ease in 
comparing the effects in studies that have focused on media 
exposure and attentions’ contribution to democratic 
outcomes.    
 Limitations should be noted for the reliability 
estimates of the citizen participation criterion measures. 
KR-20, or the coefficient alpha, was employed as a test of 
item reliability. KR-20 is utilized when respondents 
respond to a dichotomous measure, such as indicating that 
they did or did not participate in an activity. The 
reliability of the civic participation KR-20 value was 
.537. The reliability of the political participation KR-20 
was .523. While these reliability coefficients indicate 
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that the measures are of doubtful reliability, Jerard 
(1995) argues that instruments containing less than 15 
items a value as low as .5 is satisfactory. However, 
researchers should use caution in interpreting the results 
for both civic participation and political participation, 
as low reliability is likely to lead to type II error.      
Future Research 
 There are several opportunities for future research. 
Studies concerning late night television talk shows, and 
especially political comedy programs would benefit greatly 
from content analysis of the programs. Few have studied the 
content of late night television talk shows (Moy & Pfau, 
2000; Niven, et al., 2003; Nitz, et al., 2003) and no 
systematic analysis of the content in political comedy 
programs. This would allow researchers to better understand 
the differences in the two program genres. Also, the 
analysis should occur in campaign and campaign free 
contexts to understand how the content differs across time.   
 Additionally, if this line of research is to continue, 
consideration should be paid to late night television talk 
shows and political comedy programs’ contribution to 
democratic outcomes in a campaign free context. Previous 
studies, especially the work of Drew and Weaver, have 
focused on various media during presidential elections and 
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mid-term elections. There research, and others, has 
contributed much information about how particular media 
perform during election cycles. Avoiding election cycles 
would allow researchers to assess whether respondent’s 
experience an acute sense of awareness about political 
items, and to determine the ability of the programs to 
contribute to political learning in the absence of a 
political campaign.  
 Of particular interest, is the opportunity to utilize 
political comedy programs as an educational tool to 
generate political discussions, and interest in politics. A 
fundamental question becomes how to balance the comedic 
commentary and at the same time say this is important 
without also developing cynicism.   
Conclusion  
For nearly fifty years, politicians have traded barbs 
with late night television talk show hosts, but it was the 
1992 presidential election that intensified scholarly 
attention on this television genre as a form of political 
communication. As comedians’ recognized new opportunities 
to humorously critique presidents and government, political 
comedy programs emerged satirizing traditional news media 
while also offering humorous critiques of presidential 
leadership and their policy objectives. As these genres 
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have gained prominence in presidential election cycles, 
there has been concern about the cognitive and behavioral 
implications of such programming.  
This research found that political comedy programs 
appear to be an especially informative genre of political 
communication. The Daily Show with Jon Stewart and Real 
Time with Bill Maher contribute to a wider range of 
political knowledge than did the Late Show with David 
Letterman or the Tonight Show with Jay Leno. Thus, concern 
may only be warranted if a person’s political information 
diet consists exclusively of late night television talk 
shows. While no mediation effect was found with the 
variable active reflection, this research did find that 
young voters actively reflect on the content of late night 
television talk shows and political comedy programs. 
Reflecting on political content remains an important aspect 
of making sense of the political world. 
Additionally, this research found that late night 
television talk shows and political comedy programs did not 
significantly contribute to political participation, civic 
participation, or voter likelihood. Much in the same way 
that situation comedies fail to contribute significantly to 
forms of participation, perhaps, civic participation, 
political participation, and voter likelihood are too much 
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to ask of the Late Show, the Tonight Show, the Daily Show 
and Real Time.  Political comedy programs do significantly 
contribute to political discussions, and this has been 
argued to be an important form of participation.  
While late night television talk shows receive much 
attention from political candidates, perhaps politicians 
should more freely consider political comedy programs as a 
communication outlet given their ability to significantly 
contribute to knowledge and discussion. Certainly, 
communication scholars should continue looking toward 
political comedy programs and their contributions to 
political knowledge and the democratic process. 
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Table 1 
 
Frequency Distribution for Late Night Television Talk Show 
Exposure and Attention  
         
  Exposure  Cumulative     Attention  Cumulative  
Interval Frequency Percent     Frequency  Percent 
 
0  76  18.4   74   18.0 
 
1  44  29.1   30   25.2 
 
2  26  35.4   26   31.6 
 
3  40  45.1   32   39.3 
 
4  54  58.3   31   46.8 
 
5  38  67.5   43   57.3 
 
6  30  74.8   31   64.8 
 
7  32  82.5   55   78.2 
  
8  34  90.8   37   87.1 
 
9  19  95.4   34   95.4 
 
10  19  100   19   100 
 
  412     412 
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Table 2 
 
Frequency Distribution for Political Comedy Program Exposure and 
Attention  
         
  Exposure  Cumulative     Attention  Cumulative  
Interval Frequency Percent     Frequency  Percent 
 
0  246  59.7   253   61.4 
 
1   43  70.1   38   70.6 
 
2    17  74.3   16   74.5 
   
3   17   78.4   11   77.2 
 
4   15  82.0    6   78.6 
 
5   14  85.4   13   81.8 
 
6   15  89.1   13   85.0 
   
7   11  91.7    13   88.1 
   
8   12    94.7    13   91.3 
 
9    9   96.8   16   95.1 
 
10   13  100   20   100 
 
  412     412 
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Table 3 
 
Predictors of Attention and Exposure to Nontraditional Media  
         
Variable     B       β  B      β   
     SE B     SE B    
 
     Late Night      Political Comedy 
    
Age        -1.001   -.282***     -.267    -.124* 
        (0.193)     (0.121)  
   
Sex (Male)        5.409    .096*     7.594    .222*** 
        (2.701)     (1.609) 
    
Student Classification     0.387    .022     -.305   -.028 
        (0.925)     (0.564)   
 
Parent’s Education      -.662   -.024     0.335    .020 
        (1.380)     (0.841)    
 
Family Wealth       -.236   -.012        -.157   -.013 
        (0.953)     (0.581)   
 
Political Interest      1.465    .116     -.594   -.077 
        (0.809)     (0.494) 
 
Strength of Ideology      1.404    .065     0.453    .035 
        (1.025)     (0.625) 
 
Political Discussion     -1.080   -.078     2.464    .292*** 
        (0.847)     (0.502) 
 
Broadcast News       0.653    .377***     0.092    .087 
        (0.094)           0.061) 
 
Newspaper News       -.037   -.036     0.039    .062 
        (0.060)              (0.036) 
 
Late Night Television         0.064    .105* 
           (0.031) 
 
Political Comedy Programs  0.172    .105* 
        (0.083) 
 
Note. n=401. Model for Late Night F(11, 389)= 9.33, p < .001, R2 
= 0.209. Model for Political Comedy Programs F(11, 389)= 9.205, p 
< .001, R2 = 0.207. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 – two-tailed 
test. A separate analysis found that unfolded ideology was also 
insignificant. 
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Table 4 
 
Predictors of Attention and Exposure to Traditional News Media 
         
Variable     B       β  B       β 
     SE B     SE B    
 
     Broadcast News     Newspapers  
   
Age         0.431    .210***     -.100    -.029  
            (0.099)              (0.169) 
      
Sex (Male)       -5.769   -.178***     5.169     .094** 
        (1.349)      (2.289) 
 
Student Classification     1.360    .134**     1.360    .079 
        (0.465)      (0.782) 
 
Parent’s Education      0.288    .018    -2.505    -.092** 
        (0.702)      (1.165)  
 
Family Wealth       0.469    .041     0.154    .008 
        (0.484)     (0.809) 
 
Political Interest         0.851    .116*     4.849     .391*** 
        (0.411)     (0.644) 
       
Strength of Ideology      -.919   -.074     0.950     .045 
        (0.520)      (0.870) 
 
Political Discussion      0.746    .093     1.782     .131** 
        (0.430)              (0.714)  
 
Broadcast News               0.349    .206*** 
                         (0.083) 
 
Newspaper News       0.125    .212*** 
        (0.030) 
 
Late Night Television      0.169    .292***     -.027    -.027 
        (0.024)      (0.043) 
 
Political Comedy Programs  0.064    .067     0.075    .047 
                      (0.042)      (0.071)  
 
Note. n=401. Model for Broadcast News F(11, 389)= 22.22, p < 
.001, R2 = 0.386. Model for Newspaper Reading F(11,389)= 24.10, p 
< .001, R2 = 0.405. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 – two-tailed 
test. A separate analysis found that unfolded ideology was also 
insignificant. 
 173 
Table 5 
 
Predictors of Political Interest 
 
         
 Variable    B    SE B    β 
 
  
Age     0.025 (0.012)   .089 
Sex (Male)   -.213 (0.169)  -.048* 
Student Classification -.072 (0.058)  -.052 
Parent’s Education  0.161 (0.086)   .073 
Family Wealth   -.033 (0.059)  -.021 
Strength of Ideology 0.111 (0.064)   .065 
Political Discussion 0.457 (0.048)   .418*** 
Broadcast News   0.013 (0.006)   .094* 
Newspaper News   0.026 (0.003)   .325*** 
Late Night Television 0.006 (0.003)   .072  
Political Comedy Shows -.006 (0.005)  -.048 
 
Notes. n=401. F(11, 389)= 36.10, p < .001, R2 = 0.505  
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 – two-tailed test. 
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Table 6 
 
Predictors of Political Cynicism 
 
         
 Variable     B    SE B     β 
 
 
    
Age     0.022 (0.010)   .134*  
Sex (Male)   -.153 (0.137)  -.059  
Student Classification -.068 (0.047)  -.083  
Parent’s Education  -.059 (0.070)  -.046  
Family Wealth   -.010 (0.048)  -.011  
Political Interest  0.054 (0.041)   .092  
Strength of Ideology 0.019 (0.052)   .019  
Political Discussion -.055 (0.043)  -.086  
Broadcast News   -.003 (0.005)  -.042  
Newspaper News   0.003 (0.003)   .072  
Late Night Television 0.001 (0.003)   .019  
Political Comedy Shows 0.010 (0.004)   .131*  
 
Notes. n=401. F(12, 388)= 1.58, p < .093, R2 = 0.047  
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 – two-tailed test. 
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Table 7 
 
Predictors of Civic Participation 
 
         
 Variable     B    SE B    β 
 
  
Age      -.022 (0.009)  -.152* 
Sex (Male)   -0.279 (0.119)  -.123*  
Student Classification  0.033 (0.041)   .046 
Parent’s Education   0.076 (0.060)   .067 
Family Wealth    0.056 (0.042)   .071 
Political Interest   0.031 (0.036)   .061 
Strength of Ideology  0.051 (0.045)   .058 
Political Discussion  0.065 (0.037)   .115 
Broadcast News    -.005 (0.004)  -.068 
Newspaper News    -.001 (.003)  -.018 
Late Night Television  0.002 (0.002)   .040 
Political Comedy Shows  -.002 (.004)  -.026 
 
Notes. n=401. F(12, 388)= 2.57, p < .01, R2 = 0.074  
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 – two-tailed test. 
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Table 8 
 
Predictors of Political Participation 
 
         
 Variable     B    SE B    β 
 
  
Age     -.024 (0.009)  -.154**  
Sex (Male)   -.143 (0.126)  -.057  
Student Classification 0.113 (0.043)   .145** 
Parent’s Education  -.018 (0.064)  -.014 
Family Wealth   0.074 (0.044)   .085 
Political Interest  0.051 (0.038)   .091 
Strength of Ideology  -.005 (0.048)  -.005 
Political Discussion 0.145 (0.039)   .236*** 
Broadcast News   -.001 (0.005)  -.015 
Newspaper News   0.001 (0.003)   .026 
Late Night Television 0.002 (0.002)   .047  
Political Comedy Shows -.002 (0.004)  -.023 
 
Notes. n=401. F(12, 388)= 5.10, p < .001, R2 = 0.136 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 – two-tailed test. 
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Table 9 
 
Predictors of Likelihood of Voting 
 
         
 Variable     B    SE B    β 
 
 
Age     0.017 (0.028)   .035 
Sex (Male)   -.033 (0.386)  -.004  
Student Classification 0.146 (0.131)   .060 
Parent’s Education  0.278 (0.196)   .072 
Family Wealth   -.078 (0.135)  -.029 
Political Interest  0.662 (0.155)   .378*** 
Strength of Ideology  0.176 (0.146)   .059 
Political Discussion 0.032 (0.121)   .017 
Broadcast News   0.014 (0.014)   .057 
Newspaper News   -.012 (0.008)  -.083 
Late Night Television -.001 (0.007)  -.010 
Political Comedy Shows -.005 (0.012)  -.021 
 
Notes. n=401. F(12, 388)= 6.47, p < .001, R2 = 0.167  
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 – two-tailed test. 
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Table 10 
 
Predictors of General Political Knowledge 
 
         
 Variable    B    SE B    β 
 
  
Age     0.005  (0.011)  .024 
Sex (Male)   -.037 (0.149)     -.012   
Student Classification 0.046 (0.051)  .046 
Parent’s Education  0.113 (0.076)  .072 
Family Wealth   0.109 (0.052)  .098* 
Political Interest  0.100 (0.045)  .140* 
Strength of Ideology 0.275 (0.056)  .227*** 
Political Discussion 0.083 (0.047)  .107 
Broadcast News   -.008 (0.005)  .085 
Newspaper News   0.004 (0.003)  .078 
Late Night Television 0.000 (0.003)  .003 
Political Comedy Shows 0.017 (0.005)  .185*** 
 
Notes. n=401. F(12, 388)= 10.64, p < .001, R2 = 0.248  
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 – two-tailed test. 
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Table 11 
 
Predictors of Candidate Personal Knowledge 
 
         
 Variable    B    SE B    β 
 
  
Age     0.053 (0.014)  .190***  
Sex (Male)   0.695 (0.192)  .158***  
Student Classification 0.029 (0.066)  .021  
Parent’s Education  -.056 (0.098)     -.026 
Family Wealth   0.042 (0.068)  .027 
Political Interest  0.219 (0.058)  .220*** 
Strength of Ideology 0.098 (0.073)  .058 
Political Discussion 0.211 (0.060)  .194*** 
Broadcast News   0.009 (0.007)  .069 
Newspaper News   0.001 (0.004)  .018 
Late Night Television 0.008 (0.004)  .106* 
Political Comedy Shows 0.015 (0.006)  .117* 
 
Notes. n=401. F(12, 388)= 17.79, p < .001, R2 = 0.355  
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 – two-tailed test. 
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Table 12 
 
Predictors of Political Discussion 
 
         
 Variable     B    SE B     β 
 
 
Age     -.013 (0.012)  -.050 
Sex (Male)   0.039 (0.162)   .010 
Student Classification -.023 (0.055)  -.018 
Parent’s Education  -.110 (0.082)  -.055 
Family Wealth   0.126 (0.057)   .089* 
Political Interest  0.419 (0.044)   .459*** 
Strength of Ideology 0.150 (0.061)   .097* 
Broadcast News   0.010 (0.006)   .083 
Newspaper News   0.009 (0.004)   .120* 
Late Night Television -.004 (0.003)  -.054 
Political Comedy Shows 0.024 (0.005)   .200*** 
 
Notes. n=401. F(11, 389)= 29.60, p < .001, R2 = 0.456  
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 – two-tailed test. 
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 Table 13 
 
Late Night Television Talk Show/Political Comedy Program Active 
Reflection Predicting General Political Knowledge and Campaign 
Knowledge 
         
Variable     B       β  B      β   
     SE B        SE B    
 
     General Political Campaign   
     Knowledge   Knowledge    
 
Age         0.003    .016     0.049     .175** 
        (0.011)     (0.014)  
  
Sex (Male)       -0.039   -.012     0.693    .157*** 
        (0.149)     (0.195) 
 
Student Classification     0.038    .038     0.031     .022 
        (0.051)     (0.067) 
 
Parent’s Education      0.104    .067    -0.095   -.044 
        (0.075)     (0.098) 
 
Family Wealth       0.117    .106*     0.075     .048  
        (0.052)     (0.068) 
 
Political Interest      0.135    .190**     0.303     .306*** 
        (0.040)     (0.052) 
 
Strength of Ideology      0.296    .245***     0.131     .078 
        (0.056)     (0.073) 
 
Broadcast News      -0.007   -.068     0.011    .081 
        (0.005)     (0.007) 
 
Newspaper News       0.006    .099     0.003    .042 
        (0.003)     (0.004) 
 
Late Night Television      0.001    .006     0.007    .086 
        (0.003)     (0.004) 
 
Political Comedy Programs  0.020    .218***     0.019     .150** 
        (0.005)     (0.006) 
 
LNTS/PCP Active Reflection -0.031   -.044     0.023    .022 
        (0.038)     (0.050) 
 
Note. n=401. Model for General Political Knowledge F(11, 389)= 
10.63, p < .001, R2 = .246. Model for Campaign Knowledge F(11, 
389)= 16.36, p < .001, R2 = 0.334***. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < 
.001 – two-tailed test. 
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Table 14 
 
Predictors of Late Night Television Talk Show/Political Comedy 
Active Reflection 
         
Variable      B       β    
      SE B       
 
Program     
 Active Reflection  
 
Age         -0.007    -.026** 
         (0.014)  
  
Sex (Male)         0.057     .013 
         (0.196) 
 
Student Classification      -0.138    -.100* 
    (0.067) 
 
Parent’s Education        -0.001    -.001 
             (0.099) 
 
Family Wealth           -0.086    -.055  
             (0.069) 
 
Political Interest           0.031     .031 
             (0.053) 
 
Political Ideology           0.131     .078 
             (0.074) 
 
Broadcast News            0.016     .122* 
             (0.007) 
 
Newspaper News           0.012     .144** 
            (0.004) 
 
Late Night Television          0.023     .296*** 
            (0.004) 
 
Political Comedy Programs      0.030     .234*** 
            (0.006) 
 
Note. n=401. Model for LNTS/PCP Active Reflection F(11, 389)= 
16.58, p < .001, R2 = 0.317***. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 – 
two-tailed test. 
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Figure 1. Path a establishes that the predictor variable X 
Contributes to the mediator variable M. Path b indicates 
the ability of M, the mediator variable, to predict outcome 
Y. 
X Y 
M
a b 
c’
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Figure 2.  This model demonstrates the ability of active 
reflection to mediate the relationship between late night 
television talk shows and candidate personal knowledge. 
 
Late Night 
Television 
Talk Shows 
Candidate 
Personal 
Knowledge 
Active 
Reflection
ß = .296, p < .001 ß = .022, p < .654
ß = .106, p < .05 
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Figure 3. This model demonstrates the ability of active 
reflection to mediate the relationship between political 
comedy programs and general political knowledge. 
 
Political 
Comedy 
Programs 
General 
Political 
Knowledge 
Active 
Reflection
ß = .234, p < .001 ß = -.044, p < .412
ß = .185, p < .001 
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Figure 4. This model demonstrates the ability of active 
reflection to mediate the relationship between political 
comedy programs and candidate personal knowledge. 
 
 
  
 
Political 
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Personal 
Knowledge 
Active 
Reflection
ß = .234, p < .001 ß = .022, p < .654
ß = .117, p < .05 
